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Formation of contract
Certainty and completeness
11.1 The Court of Appeal decision of Norwest Holdings Pte Ltd v
Newport Mining Ltd [2011] 4 SLR 617 ("Norwest (CA)") (on appeal
from [2010] 3 SLR 956 and discussed in (2010) 11 SAL Ann Rev 239
at paras 11.1-11.12) raised an important issue concerning the effect of a
"subject to contract" clause. The case originated from the respondent's
offer on 9 May 2008 to purchase the entire share capital of a wholly-
owned subsidiary of the appellant. This offer was in response to the
information memorandum put up by the appellant's sole liquidator.
Crucially, this offer was stated to be "subject to the terms and conditions
in the Sale and Purchase Agreement to be negotiated" Three days
later, on 12 May 2008, a massive earthquake struck the region where
the subsidiary's main assets were located. just two hours after the
earthquake, the appellant purported to accept the respondent's offer.
The respondent transferred the balance of the required deposit to the
appellant on 14 May 2008. By 3 June 2008, the respondent had not
completed the purchase of the shares even though the completion date
for doing so was 1 June 2008. The appellant then sued the respondent
for breach of contract, whilst the respondent counterclaimed against the
appellant for the return of the deposit paid.
11.2 The Court of Appeal held that the main issue was whether there
was a binding contract between the parties. The respondent had argued
that there was no concluded contract due to the "subject to contract"
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clause in its offer made on 9 May 2008. It was further argued that
conditions precedent still needed to be negotiated between the parties
and therefore the prima facie meaning of the "subject to contract" clause
should prevail, with the result that there was no binding contract
between the parties. In contrast, the appellant argued that the essential
terms of the contract had been agreed between the parties and hence the
"subject to contract" clause ought not to be given its prima facie
meaning because the context showed that the parties intended to be
bound by a contract following the acceptance of the offer made on
9 May 2008. Therefore, as is evident from these arguments, the case
turned on the proper approach to be taken in relation to a "subject to
contract" clause.
11.3 The Court of Appeal stated that the starting point in
considering whether there is a binding contract between parties should
be determined by a consideration of all the circumstances and not be
decided solely on the basis of the inclusion of a "subject to contract"
clause. The court therefore agreed with the decision of the Supreme
Court of the UK in RTS Flexible Systems Ltd v Molkerei Alois Miller
GmbH & Co KG (UK Production) [2010] 1 WLR 753 ("RTS Flexible
Systems") to the effect that a "subject to contract" clause could be waived
by the parties if the circumstances showed this to be the case: Norwest
(CA) at [24].
11.4 The Court of Appeal further noted that, even if the essential
terms of a contract had been agreed upon, parties entering into a
contract containing a "subject to contract" clause may still be taken to
intend that they not be contractually bound until a formal contract is
subsequently executed. This would be the default position unless there is
"strong and exceptional evidence to the contrary": Norwest (CA) at [29].
In support of this approach, the court referred to the Malaysian case
of Low Kar Yit v Mohamed Isa [1963] MLJ 165, in which Gill J said
(at [173]), that the courts will tend to give effect to a "subject to
contract" clause unless there is strong evidence to the contrary.
11.5 It appears, therefore, that the approach of the Court of Appeal
in Norwest (CA) is to presume - rebuttably - that when parties use a
"subject to contract" clause, they intend for its prima facie meaning to
apply. This presumption can be rebutted, although it seems that this
would be an exceptional case requiring "strong and exceptional
evidence", and the fact that parties had nothing left to negotiate does not
necessarily rebut this presumption. This understanding of the court's
holding is consistent with the court's earlier reference to the RTS Flexible
Systems case: in deciding whether the presumption that the parties
intended the prima facie meaning of a "subject to contract" clause to be
rebutted, the court is to have regard to all the circumstances of the case.
In other words, the inclusion of a "subject to contract" clause is not
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determinative. However, such an inclusion is not without significance,
for it means a court's analysis commences on the footing that there is a
rebuttable presumption to the effect already described above.
11.6 Applying this approach to the facts of Norwest (CA), the Court
of Appeal found that the parties did not intend to be contractually
bound until a formal sale and purchase agreement had been negotiated
and executed. In particular, the court placed emphasis on the numerous
references in the parties' correspondences to "subject to contract"
clauses. In addition, the offer made on 9 May 2008 was itself stated to be
"subject to contract" in more than one place. In fact, the appellant's own
acceptance stated that a formal sale and purchase agreement was to be
negotiated and executed between the parties. These facts led the court to
conclude objectively that the parties had intended to further negotiate a
sale and purchase agreement such that the "subject to contract" clause
ought to be given its prima facie meaning.
11.7 Next, the Court of Appeal found that there was not a "very
strong and exceptional context" which would override the prima facie
meaning of the "subject to contract" clauses found in the parties'
correspondence and, it may be added, principally in the respondent's
offer on 9 May 2008: Norwest (CA) at [31]. On the contrary, the facts
confirmed that the parties intended for the prima facie meaning of the
"subject to contract" clause to apply. First, the respondent needed to
obtain third-party funding to complete the purchase once the sale and
purchase agreement had been negotiated and agreed upon. Second, the
respondent's trading halt of its shares was not indicative of a concluded
agreement with the appellant. Finally, the respondent's payment of the
deposit was made pursuant to an express term of the information
memorandum and on the understanding that it would be refunded if
the sale and purchase agreement were not to materialise. As a result, the
Court of Appeal found that there was no binding contract between the
parties and ordered the appellant to return the paid deposit to the
respondent.
11.8 Another decision of the Court of Appeal, Soon Kok Tiang v DBS
Bank Ltd [2012] 1 SLR 397, discussed the issue of when a contract will
be void for uncertainty. The case arose out of an action brought by the
appellants, who were investors in a series of callable basket credit-linked
notes known as "DBS High Notes 5" ("HN5"), to recover their
investment sums under the said notes. The HN5 had been terminated
due to the global financial crisis of 2008. The respondent bank informed
the appellants that no sum would be due or payable to them as a result
of the financial crisis. This rendered the appellants' investments in the
HN5 worthless. The appellants' legal strategy to recover their investment
sums was to argue that the HN5 were void at the time of their issuance
and that the principal sums they had paid ought therefore to be
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returned to them. The HN5 were said to be void because a material term
of the contract underlying the HN5, which concerned the calculation of
the sum payable in the event of early termination, was uncertain. It was
uncertain because (it was argued) four possible (and contradictory)
methods of calculation were included in various parts of a document
known as the pricing statement. Furthermore, it was argued that two
methods of calculation were not workable because there was
uncertainty in the formulae for the calculation specified.
11.9 The Court of Appeal characterised the issue as a question of
fact, rather than a question of law. After perusing the evidence, it found
that the third method of calculation was the operative one and therefore
the appellants' argument, which centred on uncertainty, failed. Further,
it also found that the formulae for calculation were not uncertain and
that, properly interpreted in the context, were entirely workable. The
appellants therefore failed. In choosing to deal with the issue as a
question of fact, the Court of Appeal provided a timely reminder that
the question of whether a contract is void for uncertainty is a very
factual one. However, that factual enquiry must have been guided by
legal principles operating in the background, for it is otherwise
impossible to know whether the threshold of uncertainty had been
breached on the facts. In this regard, the Court of Appeal had referred to
the legal arguments raised by both parties, though it did not indicate its
express agreement with them. However, the principles appear clear. As
argued by counsel, the starting point is that stated by the House of Lords
in G Scammell and Nephew Limited v H C and J G Ouston [1941]
AC 251, to the effect that it is only where the words of the contract failed
to evince any definite meaning on which the court could safely act, that
the court could say the contract was void for uncertainty. This is to be a
measure of last resort. On the facts, this high threshold was evidently
not crossed, because the court found that, in any event, there was no
uncertainty.
Offer and acceptance
11.10 It is trite law that there must be, inter alia, a coincidence of offer
and acceptance in order for a contract to be formed. This proposition is
easy to state, but more complicated in practice.
Acceptance of an offer to settle
11.11 The High Court decision of Robert Bosch GmbH v YSH Pte Ltd
[2011] SGHC 148 ("Robert Bosch GmbH") raised the issue of whether
there was an acceptance of a compromise. In that case, the plaintiffs had
written to the defendant proposing a settlement of an action based on
the alleged infringement of the plaintiffs' intellectual property rights.
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Crucially, out of the five terms proposed by the plaintiffs, the
defendant's response was unequivocal only in respect of four terms. In
relation to the term requiring the defendant to provide the plaintiffs
with information with regard to Chinese suppliers or printers related to
the intellectual property infringement action, the defendant's response
was that it would only assist the plaintiffs "in so far as to information
already available to you through your seizure" ("Provision- of-
Information Term"). The pertinent issue was whether the defendant's
response to these terms constituted an acceptance of the plaintiffs' offer
to settle.
11.12 In dealing with this issue, Andrew Ang J referred to the
well-established principle that a compromise will only arise if it satisfied
the normal requirements of formation applicable to contracts generally,
as stated by the Court of Appeal in Gay Choon Ing v Loh Sze Ti Terence
Peter [2009] 2 SLR(R) 332 at [46]-[47]. Out of the constituent
requirements of offer and acceptance, consideration and an intention to
create legal relations, the crucial element was whether the defendant's
response constituted a "final and unqualified expression of assent to
terms of the [plaintiffs'] [o]ffer": Robert Bosch GmbH at [16]. On the
facts, Ang J held that there had been no acceptance of the plaintiffs' offer
to settle by the defendant. It was significant that the defendant expressed
its reaction to the Provision-of-Information Term differently from its
unqualified responses to the other terms. The learned judge read the
defendant's response as being only to assist the plaintiffs with
information the plaintiffs already had. This was therefore different from
what the plaintiffs had asked for, viz, the provision of information which
they did not have. Therefore, the defendant's response to the Provision-
of-Information Term was really a rejection or a counter-offer of
that particular term and hence there was no overall acceptance of
the plaintiffs' proposed compromise. This case is therefore an apt
illustration of the "mirror image rule" that requires an unequivocal and
absolute assent to an offer before acceptance is established.
Lapse of offer after reasonable time
11.13 Just as an offer must be accepted unequivocally and absolutely,
it must also be accepted before it has been terminated. In this regard,
an offer may be terminated by the lapse of time. The time period
concerned may be expressly stipulated in the offer (see Dickson Trading
(S) Pte Ltd v Transmarco Ltd [1987] 2 SLR(R) 674) or, if it is not, be after
a reasonable passage of time. What constitutes a "reasonable time" was
raised in the High Court decision of Ng Irene v Tan Meng Heng Robin
[2011] SGHC 128. In that case, a court order was made on 9 February
2010 in the course of divorce proceedings directing the plaintiff wife to
receive a property at Stratton Walk, and the defendant husband to
receive a property at The Calrose. The defendant subsequently made an
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offer on 14 April 2010 to the plaintiff to swap the properties. This offer
was expressly stated to last for three days. However, on 21 April 2010, the
defendant wrote to the plaintiff urging the latter to seriously reconsider
the proposed swap after the plaintiff had rejected the proposal on
20 April 2010. This letter of 21 April 2010 did not stipulate any express
expiration of the offer. The plaintiff accepted the offer on 3 June 2010,
and the question before Kan Ting Chiu J was whether the offer had
lapsed by then.
11.14 The learned judge considered that there was no expiration
specified for the 21 April 2010 offer. As such, his Honour had to
consider when the offer could be taken to have reasonably lapsed. It was
important that the court order for the original transfer of properties
mandated such transfer to be completed by 9 July 2010. His Honour
therefore thought that this was a reasonable date when the defendant's
offer to swap would lapse because the plaintiff ought to be accorded
sufficient time up until 9 July 2010 to consider the offer carefully, given
the importance of the matter. Since the plaintiff had accepted the offer
before 9 July 2010, the original court order was varied so as to effect the
proposed swap. The learned judge's consideration of the facts illustrates
the very factual nature of the enquiry relating to when an offer had
lapsed after a reasonable time.
Lapse of offer in event offundament change in circumstance
11.15 In last year's version of the present work, the High Court
decision of Norwest Holdings Pte Ltd v Newport Mining Ltd [2010]
3 SLR 956 was noted to have raised the interesting issue of whether an
offer would lapse in the event of a fundamental change in circumstance
by the operation of an implied term in the offer ((2010) 11 SAL
Ann Rev 239 at para 11.7). Belinda Ang Saw Ean J considered that the
juridical basis for an offer lapsing due to changed circumstances could
be based on either Financings Ltd v Stimson [1962] 1 WLR 1184
("Financings Ltd") (which had implied a condition into the offer that
the subject matter of the offer must remain in substantially the same
condition as it was at the time of the offer, failing which the offer
lapses), or Dysart Timbers Limited v Roderick William Nielsen [20091
3 NZLR 160 ("Dysart Timbers") (which had required the change in
circumstances to be fundamental before the associated offer could be
said to have lapsed). Common to both approaches is the implication of
a term to the offer concerned.
11.16 In the end, Ang J did not regard the reasoning employed in
Financings Ltd and Dysart Timbers as convincing due to the artificiality
of implying a term to unanticipated changes in circumstances. Instead,
her Honour thought that the distinct doctrines of offer and acceptance
or common mistake were adequate to explain the consequences of
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changed circumstances which occur after an offer was made and before
the offer was accepted. However, Ang J's approach leaves unaddressed
the situation where the changed circumstances had become known after
the offer was made, but before that offer was accepted. In such a
situation, the offer has already been made and therefore such changed
circumstances cannot be taken into account in construing the ambit of
the offer. The doctrine of common mistake is likewise inapplicable
because a contract has not been formed. Therefore, it may be said that
the "implied term" approach in either Financings Ltd or Dysart Timbers
remains of some use.
11.17 The High Court's decision in Norwest Holdings Pte Ltd v
Newport Mining Ltd [2010] 3 SLR 956 has since attracted the attention
of academic writers who had peripherally hoped for the Court of
Appeal to express its views on this issue at a subsequent date: see,
eg, Christopher Hare, "Changed Circumstances and Lapsing Offers"
[2010] LMCLQ 379 and David McLauchlan and Rick Bigwood, "Lapse
of Offers Due to Changed Circumstances: A Contract Conversation"
(2011) 27 JCL 222. However, when the case reached the Court of Appeal
during the year under review (reported as [2011] 4 SLR 617 and
discussed above at paras 11.1-11.7), the court declined to express a firm
view on the correctness of the High Court's view of the issue at hand as
it had decided the appeal on a separate ground: [2011] 4 SLR 617
at [38]. Therefore, this issue, whilst interesting, remains to be
determinatively resolved as a matter of Singapore law. However, the fact
that the Court of Appeal did not expressly endorse Ang J's view, that
Financings Ltd and Dysart Timbers were unconvincing in explaining the
lapsing of an offer due to changed circumstances, is perhaps a hint that
these cases remain of utility in Singapore law.
Formation of oral collateral contract
11.18 Whether a contract is formed is an enquiry that is highly
dependent on the specific facts of the case. This remains the case
whether the contract is oral or written and whether it is the main
contract or a collateral contract. These general principles relating to the
factual nature of the enquiry found expression in the High Court
decision of Communication Design International Ltd v Swarovski
Management Pte Ltd [2011] SGHC 110. The issue in that case was
whether the parties had agreed to an oral agreement which contained,
principally, a buy back term. After a thorough examination of the
evidence, in particular the inconsistencies in the evidence of the party
seeking to prove the oral agreement, Woo Bih Li J found that the alleged
oral agreement was not in fact formed between the parties.
11.19 Turning now to the more specific issue of the formation of an
oral collateral contract, this was one of the issues dealt with by the High
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Court in Goldzone (Asia Pacific) Ltd (formerly known as Goldzone
(Singapore) Ltd) v Creative Technology Centre Pte Ltd [2011] SGHC 103
("Goldzone"). The case arose out of a suit brought by the plaintiff tenant
against the defendant landlord for misrepresentation. The plaintiff
alleged that the defendant had, through its employee, made eight false
representations to it and thereby induced it to enter into three tenancy
agreements. Related to its action in misrepresentation, the plaintiff
also pleaded that the defendant's representations constituted an oral
collateral contract, which had been breached. Andrew Ang J dismissed
the plaintiff's claim of misrepresentation because he found that none of
the eight alleged representations were either made or had induced the
plaintiff to enter into the lease agreements. In any event, even if the
representations had been actionable, his Honour found that the plaintiff
had affirmed the lease agreements. This left the learned judge to deal
with the oral collateral contract issue in two distinct stages. First, his
Honour considered whether the representations could be admitted to
prove the oral collateral contract in the first place. Second, assuming
that the representations could be so admitted, his Honour proceeded to
consider whether the substantive requirements of an oral collateral
contract had been satisfied so as to lead to its formation.
11.20 In relation to the admissibility of the representations to prove
an oral collateral contract, Ang J referred to the parol evidence rule as
codified in ss 93 and 94 of the Evidence Act (Cap 97, 1997 Rev Ed).
Although the general tenor of the rule as embodied within s 94 is that
evidence of any oral agreement or statement is not admissible to add to,
vary or contradict the written contract proved under s 93, s 94(b) allows,
by way of an exception, extrinsic evidence to be admitted to prove the
existence of a separate oral agreement. However, that oral agreement
must be in relation to any matter on which the written contract is silent.
The oral agreement must also not be inconsistent with the terms of the
written contract. The requirement that the oral agreement not be
inconsistent has been restated many times by the local courts, most
prominently by the Court of Appeal in Latham Scott v Credit Suisse First
Boston [2000] 2 SLR(R) 30 at [21] and by the High Court in Lemon
Grass Pte Ltd v Peranakan Place Complex Pte Ltd [2002] 2 SLR(R) 50
at [126].
11.21 Applying s 94(b), Ang J held that the representations allegedly
made by the defendant were not admissible because they were
inconsistent with the express terms of the lease agreements. His Honour
raised one specific example, pointing to the inconsistency between the
alleged representation that the defendant would upgrade the premises,
as contrasted with the express term in the lease agreements that the
plaintiff would take over the premises in an "as is where is" condition.
However, it is unclear from the judgment whether every alleged
representation was inconsistent with the terms of the lease agreements.
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The learned judge had simply stated that six clauses of the lease
agreements contradicted the "slew of representations" allegedly made by
the defendant: Goldzone at [44]. Even though the learned judge had
referred to just six clauses when there had been eight alleged
representations, it is entirely plausible that the substance of those six
clauses collectively contradicted all of the representations. This is an
important point because it raises the question of whether s 94(b)
requires each and every oral statement sought to be admitted - and
which would form the terms of the oral agreement sought to be proved -
to be inconsistent with the written contract. The answer to this question
must be in the affirmative. This is because a single oral statement that is
not inconsistent with the written contract can possibly form a separate
oral agreement consisting of just a single term. Such an oral agreement
would still be contemplated under s 94(b). Of course, it might be more
difficult to show that the parties had the intention of forming a binding
contract consisting of a single term, but that relates to the separate
question of whether the substantive requirements of a collateral
contract are satisfied, as opposed to the admissibility of evidence. The
possibility just referred to means that oral statements, sought to be
admitted under s 94(b), must all be inconsistent with the written
contract. From the tenor of the judgment, this must have been the case
in Goldzone.
11.22 Although Ang J found that the representations were not
admissible, his Honour, nonetheless, proceeded to deal with the
question of whether the representations, if admitted, satisfied the
substantial requirements of an oral collateral contract. In this regard,
Ang J held that an oral collateral contract must satisfy four distinct
requirements: (a) the statements (that is, the alleged representations)
must be promissory in nature rather than representational; (b) certainty
of terms; (c) separate consideration; and (d) existence of an intention
that the statement is to be legally binding: Goldzone at [45]. On the facts,
Ang J held that the plaintiff, by not making relevant submissions as to
the fulfilment of these substantive requirements, had not discharged its
burden of proof in establishing the existence of an oral collateral
contract, referring to, inter alia, Lemon Grass v Peranakan Place Complex
Pte Ltd [2002] 2 SLR(R) 50 at [118]. Crucially, the learned judge
appeared to have placed much weight on the fact that the alleged
representations were "glaringly inconsistent" with the terms of the lease
agreements: Goldzone at [46]. It is unclear, however, how the fact of
inconsistency related to the four substantial requirements of an oral
collateral contract. This fact appears more relevant to the issue of
admissibility, which had already been dealt with by the judge. It is
important, in this regard, to distinguish the two separate questions
relating to admissibility of evidence and, whether on that evidence, an
oral collateral contract was in fact formed.
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Consideration
11.23 It is well established that consideration for a promise must be
causally related to the promise itself. Thus, a promise that is given as a
mere expression of gratitude for past services is unsupported by valid
consideration: that promise is given for past consideration which is no
consideration. However, the courts look to substance rather than the
form of the parties' transaction to determine if consideration was truly
past. These principles are well-illustrated by the High Court decision of
Foo Song Mee v Ho Kiau Seng [2011] SGHC 4 and the subsequent Court
of Appeal decision of Foo Song Mee v Ho Kiau Seng [2011] SGCA 45
("Foo Song Mee (CA)"). In this case, the plaintiff, a real estate agent,
claimed the balance of a sum from the defendant pursuant to an alleged
contract. Under that contract, the defendant had allegedly agreed to pay
the plaintiff a commission in consideration of the plaintiff procuring
"a good price" in relation to the defendant's en bloc purchase of
some apartments. The High Court found that the quantum of the
commission was not agreed before the options to purchase the
apartments were granted. There was instead only a promise to pay an
unspecified sum before the defendant secured the options. The final
sum was agreed (if at all) only in a subsequent agreement after the
options had been granted. Therefore, according to the court, the
plaintiff's effort in securing a good price was past consideration in
relation to the subsequent agreement.
11.24 The judgment of the High Court was overturned by the Court
of Appeal in Foo Song Mee (CA). The appellate court's decision
emphasised the importance of looking at the substance of the
transaction; it disagreed with the High Court's finding that
consideration was past. The error, according to the Court of Appeal, was
in viewing the subsequent agreement on the quantum of commission in
isolation, rather than in its proper context. Viewed holistically, there was
clearly consideration as the plaintiff had forgone her entitlement to
reasonable remuneration and substituted it with the specific sum
agreed. The plaintiff was entitled to a reasonable remuneration because
the court would have implied a term based on contractual quantum
meruit for the defendant to pay the plaintiff a reasonable sum for the
services the plaintiff had rendered. This is, therefore, consistent with
the principle that whether consideration is past is to be assessed
substantively, rather than formally. This approach is in fact encapsulated
in the Privy Council decision of Pao On v Lau Yiu Long [1980] AC 614,
which sets out three cumulative elements to be satisfied before an act
done before the giving of a promise can be consideration for that
promise, although that case was not referred to by the Court of Appeal.
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The terms of the contract
Incorporation of terms and contractual discretion
Distinction between terms and representations
11.25 A preliminary question when considering the terms of a
contract is whether a statement is an express contractual term, or a mere
representation standing outside the contract itself. The issue arose for
consideration in the Court of Appeal decision of Anti-Corrosion Pte Ltd v
Berger Paints Singapore Pte Ltd [2012] 1 SLR 427 ("Anti- Corrosion Pte
Ltd"). The relevant question in that case was whether the respondent's
representative gave certain assurances to the appellant's representative
regarding the use of its paint (including a warranty as to quality), and
whether those assurances formed part of the contract. These assurances
and warranty were alleged to have been made by the respondent's
representatives through several statements.
11.26 Having found that those assurances were in fact given, the court
considered whether the parol evidence rule precluded the admission of
the statements giving rise to those assurances into evidence. The court
ruled that it did not. In particular, the court found that the written
contract between the parties (comprising tax invoices and delivery
orders) did not "comprise the entirety of the contractual relationship
between the parties" and hence the statements made by the respondent's
representatives could be admitted into the evidence. While the court did
not state so, it is likely that the operative statutory provision was s 94(b)
of the Evidence Act, also considered above in relation to the High Court
decision of Goldzone: see paras 11.19-11.22 above. That provision
allows for the proof of the existence of any separate oral agreement that
concerns any matter on which the written contract is silent and which is
not inconsistent with its terms. On the facts, the statements concerning
the assurances on the use of the paint and the related warranty were not
mentioned in the written contract. Hence, it is likely that s 94(b) was
the operative provision that allowed the admission of the relevant
statements.
11.27 Having considered that the statements were admissible,
the court next considered whether they were "contractual terms or
non-binding representations merely intended to induce the other party
to enter into the contract without imposing any responsibility for
breach of contract": Anti-Corrosion Pte Ltd at [26]. In answering this
question, the court relied on Lord Denning MR's statement of principle
in Dick Bentley Productions Ltd v Harold Smith (Motors) Ltd [1965]
1 WLR 623 to the effect that if a representation was made in the course
of dealings for a contract to induce the other party to act upon it, and
actually induces that other party to enter into the contract, then, it is
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likely that the representation was in fact a term of the contract, unless it
could be shown that the statement was innocently made. Applying this
principle, the court thought that the statements were clearly important
to the appellant's representative, who would not have accepted the
proposed paint system otherwise. This raised a prima facie inference that
the representations were in fact terms of the contract. The court
emphasised that the respondent had the greater expertise in and
knowledge of its own paint products and hence this inference was not
rebutted. The result is that the court found that the statements
concerned, comprising the assurances and warranty, were express terms
of the contract. However, one might consider that when Lord Denning
stated the principle laid out above, he had done so at a time before
statutory remedies for misrepresentation were made available.
Therefore, there was perhaps a need to more readily infer promissory
intent. In the present day, the question could perhaps be reduced to
simply whether there was meant to be a promissory term.
Terms implied in fact
11.28 There used to be some uncertainty whether the implication of
terms in fact is governed by the "business efficacy test", the "officious
bystander test", or both. In so far as Singapore is concerned, the
uncertainty has been resolved by the High Court in Forefront Medical
Technology (Pte) Ltd v Modern-Pak Pte Ltd [2006] 1 SLR(R) 927
("Forefront Medical Technology"), in which it explained that the two tests
are complementary to each other, and that the "officious bystander test"
is the practical mode by which the "business efficacy test" is implemented.
Decisions in the year under review demonstrate just how that
explanation is to be applied. It is important, however, to note as a
preliminary point, that the implication of a term must not contradict
the express wording of the contract concerned. Were it otherwise, the
implication of the term concerned will fail, without more. This was
pointed out by the High Court in Holdrich Investment Ltd v Siemens AG
[2011] SGHC 265 ("Holdrich Investment Ltd").
11.29 An example of a case applying the explanation in Forefront
Medical Technology on the implication of terms in fact is the High
Court decision of ABN AMRO Bank NV Singapore Branch v CWT
Commodities (SEA) Pte Ltd [2011] 2 SLR 891 ("ABNAMRO Bank NV").
In that case, the defendant warehouse company contracted with the
plaintiff bank to manage tin products for which the plaintiff provided
trade financing. It transpired that the defendant had issued warehouse
receipts and certificates of quality in respect of released tin products
which had not left the warehouse, but which were subsequently
re-pledged as fresh collateral. A question arose as to whether there was
an implied term in the parties' agreement which obliged the defendant
to inform the plaintiff of this fact. Woo Bih Li J found that such a term
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could, in fact, be implied. His Honour, having referred to Forefront
Medical Technology, held that it was "necessary for the efficacy of the
[parties' agreement]" to imply a term obliging the defendant to inform
the plaintiff of any tin product which was not physically leaving and
entering the warehouse after they had been released and subsequently
re-pledged: ABNAMRO Bank NV at [75] and [76]. Woo J's statement of
the applicable test, which links the efficacy of the contract to the
criterion of "necessity", demonstrates just how the High Court's
rationalisation of the two traditional tests in Forefront Medical
Technology is to be understood. The tests are not alternatives for one
another, nor are they cumulative; rather, they are applied in the sense
that the normative quality of "efficacy" is conditioned through the
requirement of "necessity".
11.30 Lai Siu Chiu J in the High Court decision of Holdrich
Investment Ltd adopted a similar view of the applicable test to ascertain
if a term should be implied in fact. Her Honour expressed agreement
with the approach advocated in Forefront Medical Technology and stated
that the "touchstone ... for [the] application of the 'business efficacy' or
'officious bystander' test ... is that of necessity". To this statement it may,
with respect, be added that while the criterion of "necessity" is certainly
important in the implication of a term in fact, it is, however, without
normative force. To frame the test as one premised on "necessity" begs
the question, "necessary to do what?" As discussed in the preceding
paragraph, this is precisely how the High Court's explanation in
Forefront Medical Technology provides normative force to the otherwise
bare criterion of "necessity": it explains that the implication of the term
must be necessary for business efficacy. This is how the "officious
bystander test" becomes the practical mode by which the "business
efficacy test" is implemented: cf Holdrich Investment Ltd at [85].
11.31 Leaving aside the relationship between the "business efficacy
test" and the "officious bystander test", a broader question is whether
these traditional tests have been overtaken by a broader test based on
the interpretation of the contract concerned. This possibility originated
from Lord Hoffmann's judgment in the Privy Council decision of
Attorney General of Belize v Belize Telecom Ltd [2009] 1 WLR 1988
("Attorney General of Belize"). Lord Hoffmann explained that the
implication of terms in fact is really an exercise of contractual
interpretation. Therefore, whenever a court sought to imply a term, it
must ask itself "whether such a provision would spell out in express
words what the instrument, read against the relevant background,
would reasonably be understood to mean": Attorney General of Belize
at [21].
11.32 Although the Court of Appeal in MFM Restaurants Pte Ltd v
Fish & Co Restaurants Pte Ltd [2011] 1 SLR 150 ("MFM Restaurants")
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expressly rejected Lord Hoffmann's test as being unnecessarily abstract,
it is interesting to note that the same court has now in Fong Song Mee v
Ho Kiau Seng [2011] SGCA 45 ("Fong Song Mee (CA)") noted that
the implication of terms (generally) "should always be a matter of
construction in the light of the precise circumstances of the case, in
particular, the objective intention of the parties": Fong Song Mee (CA)
at [15]. While one should not ascribe too great an importance on a
single sentence in the court's judgment, this allusion to construction
does at least raise, slightly, the question of whether the court's
fundamental understanding of the implication of terms may be
premised on interpretation, even if the test it chooses to apply is not
such. However, given the clear rejection of Lord Hoffmann's test in
MFM Restaurants, the Court of Appeal's statement in Fong Song Mee
(CA) may be explained on the basis that the court was referring to a
consideration of the facts of the case when implying a term in fact.
There is certainly nothing amiss about this since the nature of the
enquiry is, it bears repeating, factual in nature. It might also be briefly
noted that the test in Attorney General of Belize was raised by counsel as
being the test of implication in the High Court case of Kim Eng
Securities Pte Ltd v Goh Teng Poh Karen [2011] SGHC 201 at [66],
although the court in that case did not comment on the correctness of
the submission.
Terms implied in law
11.33 In the High Court decision of Chan Miu Yin v Phillip Morris
Singapore Pte Ltd [2011] SGHC 161 ("Chan Miu Yin"), an issue arose as
to whether certain terms could be implied in law in employment
contracts generally. These terms were (a) the implied term that the
employer will treat an employee fairly in the manner of dismissal; and
(b) the implied term that the employer will not exercise the contractual
right to terminate the employment in bad faith. It is important to note
that the action before the court was an application by the defendant to
strike out the plaintiff's claim based on these implied terms. As such, the
court need not decide determinatively that the plaintiff succeeded; all
that it needed to be satisfied of was that the plaintiff's claim did not
clearly and plainly disclose no reasonable cause of action.
11.34 In relation to the implied term relating to unfair dismissal, the
court was not prepared to find that such a term could not be implied in
Singapore. However, it bears noting that the court did not rule
determinatively whether such a term was implied; all it held was that it
could be and that this is an issue to be decided after a fuller
consideration of the relevant authorities. In its reasoning, the court
found plausible Lord Millet's reasoning in Johnson v Unisys Ltd [2003]
1 AC 518 - as adapted to the local context - that there was no need to
imply a term in law into employment contracts to protect employees
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from being dismissed in an unfair manner since there exists various
statutory protection to employees generally under the Employment Act
(Cap 91, 2009 Rev Ed). The court also noted that there is no express
statutory right against unfair dismissal in Singapore. While the court
thought that this meant the questions relating to the fairness of
dismissal would be a matter of democratic decision that falls outside the
province of the courts, it also noted that the non-existence of an express
statutory right could also signify Parliament's intention to leave the issue
to be decided by the courts. Ultimately, given that the courts in
Singapore have not had the opportunity to consider the reasoning in
Johnson v Unisys, and the extent to which the reasoning there applied to
the local legislative framework, the court was not prepared to strike out
the plaintiff's claim based on the implied term relating to unfair
dismissal. This was a decidedly cautious approach since the court had, in
fact, examined most of the cases, but yet declined to express a concluded
view.
11.35 In relation to the implied term relating to the non-exercise of
the contractual right to terminate the contract in bad faith, the court
considered that the Court of Appeal decision of Latham Scott v Credit
Suisse First Boston [2000] 2 SLR(R) 30 at [48] "presupposes that the
employer had a duty not [to] terminate employment in bad faith"
[emphasis in original] because the Court of Appeal was willing, in that
case, to consider whether the employer had been motivated by bad faith
in dismissing the employee. The court also considered the apparent
obstacle against the implied term being argued posed by the Court of
Appeal decision of Ng Giap Hon v Westcomb Securities Pte Ltd [2009]
3 SLR(R) 518 ("Ng Giap Hon"). The apparent obstacle was the Court of
Appeal's holding in Ng Giap Hon that there is no general implied term
of good faith (in law) in all contracts. However, the court in the present
case considered that the precise question of whether there is a sui generis
contractual duty not to terminate an employment in bad faith was not
placed before the Court of Appeal in Ng Giap Hon. For all these reasons,
it could not be said conclusively that the law does not recognise an
implied term relating to the non-exercise of the contractual right to
terminate the contract in bad faith, and the plaintiff's claim was
similarly not struck out on this basis (although it was eventually struck
out for a different reason).
11.36 The broader point from Chan Miu Yin arising out of the court's
cautious approach must be that the courts will be very careful in
implying terms in law. This, to be fair, is entirely consistent with the
Court of Appeal's direction in Jet Holding Ltd v Cooper Cameron
(Singapore) Pte Ltd [2006] 3 SLR(R) 769 at [89] that courts should
indeed adopt a higher degree of care when implying terms in law, as
compared with implying terms in fact. The rationale for this extra level
of care is that terms implied in law applied to all contracts of a
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particular type, as opposed to terms implied in fact which only apply to
the contract at hand.
Terms implied by statute
11.37 A few cases in the year under review concerned the implication
of terms by statute, specifically the Supply of Goods Act (Cap 394,
1999 Rev Ed) and the Sale of Goods Act (Cap 393, 1999 Rev Ed). The
High Court decision of Ho See Jui (trading as Xuanhua Art Gallery) v
Liquid Advertising Pte Ltd [2011] SGHC 108 concerned the former
statute. The relevant question was whether a condition of satisfactory
quality could be implied via s 4 of the Supply of Goods Act in a
reinstallation agreement, which was for the relocation of a water
dispensing unit and the supply of additional piping.
11.38 Lai Siu Chiu J first dealt with the preliminary issue of whether
the Supply of Goods Act applied to a reinstallation agreement. Section 4
of the Supply of Goods Act provides that it applied to a "contract for the
transfer of goods", which is in turn defined by s 1(1) to mean "a contract
under which one person transfers or agrees to transfer to another the
property in goods, other than an excepted contract". The list of excepted
contracts is provided for in s 1(2). Lai J noted that even though the
reinstallation agreement involved the provision of services, this did not
render the Supply of Goods Act inapplicable since s 1(3) provides that a
contract could still be a contract for the transfer of goods even if
services are provided under the contract. More importantly, the learned
judge emphasised that the reinstallation agreement contemplated the
supply of additional piping, and hence the Supply of Goods Act applied.
This meant that s 4 implied two conditions: first, via s 4(2), a condition
of "satisfactory quality" was implied; and second, via ss 4(4) and 4(5),
a condition of reasonable fitness for any particular purpose made
known to the transferee, whether expressly or by implication, was
implied. On the facts, both implied conditions were found to have been
breached.
11.39 The Court of Appeal decision of Chai Cher Watt (trading as
Chuang Aik Engineering Works) v SDL Technologies Pte Ltd [2012]
1 SLR 152 dealt with the implication of a condition via s 13 of the Sale
of Goods Act (Cap 393, 1999 Rev Ed). The case concerned a contract for
the sale of, inter alia, a drilling machine from the respondent to the
appellant. The contract provided that the drilling machine would be
11 metres in length. However, it was later discovered that the machine
was in fact 13.5 metres in length. The appellant argued that a condition
was implied via s 13 of the Sale of Goods Act. The Court of Appeal
agreed with this submission. Pursuant to s 13(1), it is an implied
condition that the goods will correspond with the description provided
in the contract. Since s 13(1) classifies every description of the contract
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as a condition, any breach of it, no matter how small, will entitle the
innocent party to treat the contract as discharged. The Hongkong Fir
approach in the English Court of Appeal decision of Hongkong Fir
Shipping Co Ltd v Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha Ltd [ 1962] 2 QB 26 therefore
had no application and the consequences of the breach of an implied
condition under s 13(1) did not matter. As the drilling machine was
13.5 metres and not 11 metres in length, there was a prima facie breach
of an implied condition.
11.40 In addition, the court noted that s 15A of the Sale of Goods Act
embodied the "de minimis rule". By this rule, the right to reject goods for
breach of a condition (as implied by ss 13, 14 or 15 of the Sale of Goods
Act) in non-consumer cases is limited where the breach is slight and/or
technical. However, the de minimis rule did not operate against the
appellant on the facts because the difference of 2.5 metres in length
between the specification provided and the actual length of the drilling
machine was not de minimis. Finally, for completeness, the court also
rejected an argument premised on s 11(1) of the Sale of Goods Act that
the appellant had waived its right to terminate by accepting delivery
of the drilling machine. This was because the respondent had not
discharged its burden of showing that the appellant had knowledge of
the facts giving rise to its right to terminate.
Terms implied by custom or trade practice
11.41 The High Court decision of Kim Eng Securities Pte Ltd v Goh
Teng Poh Karen [2011] SGHC 201 ("Kim Eng Securities") provides a rare
example of a local decision in which a term was found to have been
implied by custom or trade practice. The plaintiff in that case
commenced the action against the defendant to enforce an obligation to
indemnify the plaintiff for losses arising out of share trades executed by
her on behalf of her clients. However, this obligation to indemnify was
not stipulated in the defendant's letter of appointment with the plaintiff.
Neither did the defendant sign a template indemnity - which all other
dealers signed - because of an administrative oversight. The plaintiff
therefore argued that this obligation to indemnify nonetheless arose,
inter alia, either by way of a subsequent letter written in 2003 varying
the original letter of appointment ("2003 Letter"), or because a term
imposing such an obligation could be implied by custom or trade
practice.
11.42 Tay Yong Kwang J found for the plaintiff and held that an
obligation to indemnify existed. His Honour acknowledged that the
2003 Letter did in fact set out in express terms the defendant's
obligation to indemnify the plaintiff. However, the learned judge also
found that a term imposing such an obligation could be implied by
custom or trade practice. His Honour said that the requirement of an
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indemnity was applied to the plaintiff's employees performing the same
tasks as the defendant, and that such a practice "was obviously known to
the defendant and complied with by her": Kim Eng Securities at [67].
This suggests that, in order for a term to be implied by custom or trade
practice, not only must the custom or trade practice be well-established
(which appears to have been found on the facts), but such custom or
trade practice must have been drawn to the defendant's attention, or
had been followed without exception for a substantial period. This
seems to impose at least a requirement of constructive knowledge
before a custom or trade practice will be found to imply a term. This
proposition was derived from a case cited by the plaintiff, viz, Duke v
Reliance Systems Ltd [1982] ICR 449 at 452.
11.43 It is, however, important to recognise that Duke v Reliance
Systems Ltd concerned an employment situation; specifically, the
question before the English Employment Appeal Tribunal was the
correct "normal retiring age" for an employee in the appellant's position,
pursuant to s 64(1)(b) of the Employment Protection (Consolidation)
Act 1978 (c 44) (UK). In that specific context, where the "normal
retirement age" may vary from employer to employer, it may be
necessary for the employee to be affixed with constructive knowledge of
the custom or trade practice concerned. However, such a requirement
may not be required more generally, especially where the custom or
trade practice is "reasonable". It is clear that a "reasonable" custom or
trade practice binds both parties whether they knew it or not. In
contrast, an "unreasonable" custom or trade practice binds only where
there is actual knowledge: see Cunliffe-Owen v Teather & Greenwood
[1967] 1 WLR 1421 at 1439. A positive requirement premised on
constructive knowledge fits uneasily with these established propositions:
constructive knowledge is unnecessary in respect of a "reasonable"
custom or trade practice, but is insufficient in respect of an
"unreasonable" custom or trade practice. It is acknowledged, of course,
that Kwang J had found actual knowledge on the facts in any event,
but it is respectfully submitted that his Honour's imposition of a
constructive knowledge requirement may need to be further examined.
Also, even if the decision could be explained on the basis of actual
knowledge, that presupposes that the custom or trade practice
concerned was "unreasonable". It may legitimately be asked if a custom
or trade practice requiring dealers to personally indemnify stockbrokers
can be regarded as "unreasonable".
Unfair Contract Terms Act
11.44 In Jiang Ou v EFG Bank AG [2011] 4 SLR 246 ("Jiang Ou"), the
High Court observed that conclusive evidence clauses which purported
to exclude liability for fraud committed by a bank's employee would not
satisfy the "reasonableness test" under s 11 of the Unfair Contract Terms
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Act (Cap 396, 1994 Rev Ed) ("UCTA"). As a preliminary point,
conclusive evidence clauses which exclude liability would be caught
by s 3 of the UCTA as being an exclusion of contractual liability.
Accordingly, such a clause would be subject to the "reasonableness test"
prescribed in s 11 of the UCTA. In addition, as yet another preliminary
point, s 11(5) of the UCTA provides that the burden lies on the party
seeking to rely on the exclusion clause to prove its reasonableness.
11.45 Steven Chong J noted that, in determining whether the
"reasonableness test" is satisfied, the relative bargaining power between
the parties is a relevant consideration. Indeed, this factor is statutorily
provided for under the Second Schedule to the UCTA, which has been
judicially taken to be relevant towards a clause caught by s 3 even
though the UCTA provides for its consideration only for clauses caught
by ss 6(3), 7(3) and 7(4). In considering this factor, Chong J noted that
where a conclusive evidence clause was reached between commercial
entities, the courts usually take a non-interventionist approach and
uphold the validity of the clause concerned. This is because of the
parties' freedom to apportion risks as they think fit and also in
consideration of the presence of insurance. On the other hand, where
one party was a private entity, the courts may well be less likely to
uphold the validity of such clauses. Chong J did not, however, express a
definitive view on this latter situation concerning a private entity since
no significant submission was made on this point.
11.46 To the learned judge's points, the following may be added. It is
clear that the specific points made with regard to commercial entities
agreeing to a conclusive evidence clause are applicable to exclusion
clauses generally. First, where parties are commercial entities, the courts
will generally uphold any exclusion clause reached as being valid.
An illustration is provided by the High Court decision of Consmat
Singapore (Pte) Ltd v Bank of America National Trust & Savings
Association [1992] 2 SLR(R) 195, where the court observed that both
parties were commercial entities and had entered into the contract
concerned out of their own free will. However, the mere fact that both
contracting parties are commercial entities does not, without more,
render an exception clause a reasonable one pursuant to the UCTA. This
was so held by the High Court in Kenwell & Co Pte Ltd v Southern Ocean
Shipbuilding Co Pte Ltd [1998] 2 SLR(R) 583, where the court pointed
out that the UCTA is intended precisely to cover, indeed to cover only,
business liability. Business liability is defined to mean a liability for
breach of obligations or duties arising from things done or to be done in
the course of business. As such, a business or commercial concern is not
any less protected by reason of being such.
11.47 Further, Chong J also held in Jiang Ou that a conclusive
evidence clause which expressly excludes liability for the fraud of a
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bank's employees would be unreasonable under the UCTA because of
the negative impact such a clause would have on public confidence and
trust in the modern banking system (Jiang On at [122]):
Individuals and corporations entrust banks and employees of banks
with their savings and investments. Public confidence in the banking
system is therefore fundamental to the integrity of the system and is
no doubt founded upon mutual trust and a reasonable expectation of
honest dealings by employees of banks. Shifting the attendant risk and
liability for the fraud or wilful misconduct of employees of banks by
way of conclusive evidence clauses, strikes at the very heart of the
presumed integrity of the system. The negative impact on public
confidence and trust in the modern banking system would, in my
view, render such clauses to be unreasonable under UCTA as well as
void as a matter of public policy.
Construction of terms
General principles
11.48 Since the Court of Appeal's decision in Zurich Insurance
(Singapore) Pte Ltd v B-Gold Interior Design & Construction Pte Ltd
[2008] 3 SLR(R) 1029 ("Zurich Insurance"), it is now clear that the
"contextual approach" applies in the interpretation of contracts in
Singapore. More fundamentally, it is clear that the enterprise of
interpretation is an objective one. As the Court of Appeal said in Ang
Tin Yong v Ang Boon Chye [2012] 1 SLR 447 at [11] "[w]hat must be
sought is the meaning that the contract conveys to a reasonable person
having the background knowledge that would have been reasonably
available to him". The court further stated that a holistic approach
should be taken and regard had to the commercial purpose of the
contract and circumstances in which it was made. The High Court in
Soo Nam Thoong v Phang Song Hua [2011] SGHC 159 at [24] alluded to
similar basic points.
11.49 Zurich Insurance prescribed a two-step framework in the
interpretation of contracts. The first step is to consider whether the
extrinsic evidence sought to be adduced can in fact be admitted. The
Court of Appeal in Zurich Insurance concluded that although the parol
evidence rule (as embodied in s 94 of the Evidence Act (Cap 97,
1997 Rev Ed)) still operates as a restriction on the use of extrinsic
material to affect a contract, extrinsic material is admissible for the
purpose of interpreting the language of the contract. Whether the
extrinsic evidence is admissible for this purpose depends on whether it
is (a) relevant (ie, it would affect the way in which the language of the
document would have been understood by a reasonable man);
(b) reasonably available to all the contracting parties; and (c) relates to a
clear and obvious context.
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11.50 The second step concerns the task of interpretation. This
involves the application of the contextual approach under the terms of
proviso (f) of s 94. The Court of Appeal in Zurich Insurance noted that
neither ambiguity nor the existence of an alternative technical meaning
is a prerequisite for the court's consideration of extrinsic material.
Instead, the court will first take into account the plain language of the
contract together with relevant extrinsic material that is evidence of its
context. It is also important to note that "context" includes internal
context as well, ie, the structure and consistency of usage within the
contract, as demonstrated by the Court of Appeal's approach in Azuma
Engineering (S) Pte Ltd v MEP Systems Pte Ltd [2011] 3 SLR 150. Then,
if in the light of this context, the plain language of the contract becomes
ambiguous (ie, it takes on another plausible meaning) or absurd, the
court will be entitled to put on the contractual term in question an
interpretation which is different from that demanded by its plain
language.
11.51 Several decisions in the year under review continued to apply
and, in the process, refine, these principles enunciated in Zurich
Insurance. In relation to the first step in the two-step framework
outlined above, viz, whether the extrinsic evidence sought to be adduced
can in fact be admitted, it must first be said that there is a distinction
between using parol evidence to contradict, vary, add to or subtract
from the terms of the contract, and using parol evidence to explain the
contract. Parol evidence in the latter situation, pursuant to s 94(j), is
generally admissible. However, parol evidence to effectively vary the
contract is not generally admissible, where the parties intended the
contract to contain all the terms of their agreement. Hence, where such
an intention is contradicted, parol evidence may be admitted to vary the
contract. This distinction was, however, blurred in the High Court
decision of Hanwha Non-Life Insurance Co Ltd v Alba Pte Ltd [2011]
SGHC 271 at [33]. The court stated that:
In the present case, the parties clearly did not intend to embody their
entire agreement in a written contract. That was why both parties
relied on extrinsic evidence to shed light on the nature of the
reinsurance policy. Such evidence would be useful if it is relevant,
reasonably available to all the contracting parties and relates to a clear
or obvious context.
11.52 With respect, whether or not the parties intended to embody
their entire agreement in a written contract does not affect the distinct
issue of whether extrinsic evidence is admissible to explain the contract.
The court's allusion to the three criteria of relevance, reasonable
availability and clear or obvious context has to do with whether
extrinsic evidence is admissible to explain the contract; the prior
question of whether the parties intended to embody their agreement
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entirely within the written contract has nothing to do with the
admission of extrinsic evidence for this purpose.
11.53 In Lonpac Insurance Bhd v American Home Assurance Co [2011]
SGHC 257 ("Lonpac Insurance"), the High Court considered whether
s 94 of the Evidence Act restricted the admission of oral evidence to
explain or even vary or contradict the written terms of a contract, when
the issue is between persons who are essentially strangers to the
contract. Judith Prakash J held that it did not, relying on the High Court
decision of China Insurance Co (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Liberty Insurance
Pte Ltd [2005] 2 SLR(R) 509 ("China Insurance"). In China Insurance,
the court had held that s 94, which excluded extrinsic evidence "as
between the parties to any such instrument", was irrelevant where third
parties were concerned. Therefore, Prakash J's holding in Lonpac
Insurance simply demonstrates an application of China Insurance.
11.54 In addition, the High Court decision of Sheng Siong
Supermarket Pte Ltd v Carilla Pte Ltd [2011] 4 SLR 1094 ("Sheng Siong
Supermarket") may also be noted. Andrew Ang J in that case suggested
that whether parol evidence is admissible depends on the purpose for
which the evidence is to be used. The learned judge elaborated as
follows (Sheng Siong Supermarket at [37]):
Relying on such evidence to interpret the contract in its proper
context is permissible; relying on the same to 'contradict or vary or
add to or subtract from' the contract is impermissible.
11.55 While this may seem to be a mere restatement of the Court of
Appeal's statement of the law in Zurich Insurance, it is suggested that the
positive placement of such an overarching "purpose" test at the start of
the enquiry gives proper effect to the parol evidence rule, which is
exclusionary in nature. Furthermore, Andrew Ang J in Sheng Siong
Supermarket examined the situations where the "purpose" test is
offended: it appears that this hinges on the scope of the meanings that
the contractual words could bear. Where the extrinsic evidence is to
render the meaning of the term concerned "completely at odds" with
either an express clause in the contract or with the meaning that the
contractual words are capable of bearing, then the purpose of their
admission would be to contradict, vary, add to or subtract from the
terms of the contract, thereby infringing the parol evidence rule: Sheng
Siong Supermarket at [38]. This statement of the law provides a useful
threshold question to ask before ascertaining if the three criteria
outlined in Zurich Insurance, viz, (a) relevance; (b) reasonable
availability; and (c) clear and obvious context, are satisfied.
11.56 Turning to the second step in the two-step framework
enunciated in Zurich Insurance, viz, the task of interpretation, the High
Court decision of Healthcare Supply Chain (Pte) Ltd v Roche Diagnostics
Contract Law 203
(2011) 12 SAL Ann Rev
Asia Pacific Pte Ltd [2011] 3 SLR 476 ("Healthcare Supply Chain") may
be usefully noted. Choo Han Teck J held that he (Healthcare Supply
Chain at [6]):
... did not hold that the contextual approach was to be the primary
rule in the construction of a contract in that if one begins the
construction of a contract by reference to it, and through it enter an
expressway into extrinsic evidence not ordinarily permissible in
the construction of a written contract, especially one that appears
complete on the face of it.
11.57 The learned judge's statement illustrates the tension between
adherence to a "modern" contextual approach, and the constraints
placed on such an approach in the Evidence Act, which was enacted at a
time when the law strongly recognised a distinction between latent and
patent ambiguity, which is itself premised on the belief that words had a
fixed meaning to them. This distinction originated from "Lord Bacon's
Maxim 25" (sometimes "Maxim 23") in the late 16th century and came
into prominence in the 18th century, by which only latent ambiguity
may be explained by means of parol evidence. On the other hand, parol
evidence was inadmissible to explain an ambiguity apparent on the face
of the instrument, ie, patent ambiguity. This distinction between latent
and patent ambiguity is still enshrined in s 95 of the Evidence Act, and
presents a legislative challenge towards adopting a strong version of
the contextual approach that would apply regardless of the type of
ambiguity present. Understood in this manner, Choo Han Teck J's
comments in Healthcare Supply Chain reveal the difficulty of reconciling
a "modern" approach towards contractual interpretation, as urged by
the House of Lords in the seminal case of Investors Compensation
Scheme Ltd v West Bromwich Building Society [ 1998] 1 WLR 896, with an
antiquated distinction between latent and patent ambiguity (which itself
is premised on a view that words have fixed meanings) preserved by
statute.
11.58 By the strong version of the contextual approach, extrinsic
evidence is always admissible to interpret the contract, regardless of the
presence or absence of ambiguity. In addition, because words are no
longer regarded as having fixed meanings, but meanings dependent
on the context, there is no need for ambiguity or absurdity before
a "departure" from the plain meaning is warranted: there is no
"departure" to speak of because the only relevant meaning is the
contextual meaning. However, s 95 provides that extrinsic evidence is
only admissible to explain the contract where there is latent ambiguity.
This implies that it is possible for words to bear a fixed meaning on their
face that is conclusive as to their meaning. Perhaps this is why, at the
second step of the Zurich Insurance framework, the Court of Appeal in
that case stated that a departure from the words' plain meaning is
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permissible if ambiguity or absurdity ensued after consideration of the
context: [2008] 3 SLR(R) 1029 at [1081 and [130] (see also at [50]).
11.59 An example where the plain meaning of the contractual words
was adhered to is the Court of Appeal decision of Lim Keenly Buildings
Pte Ltd v Tokio Marine Insurance Singapore Ltd [2011] 4 SLR 286 ("Lim
Keenly"). In that case, it was held that a plain meaning of the contractual
clause concerned not only accorded with the interpretation contended
for, but also aligned with the commercial purpose of the broader
contract. Indeed, as the court reminds us (Lim Keenly at [28]):
If the meaning of a clause was clear from the language of the clause
itself, having regard to the context of the contract, it was unnecessary
to canvass arguments pertaining to other specific features of the
contract to 'aid' the interpretation of this clause, except where these
specific arguments might demonstrate that the meaning of the clause
was not so clear as it appeared at first blush.
11.60 This statement clearly captures the holding in Zurich Insurance
that the plain meaning of contracts should not be departed from unless,
as aided by the context, an ambiguity or absurdity ensues. This
demonstrates that contractual interpretation in Singapore is still
affected by old ideas concerning the fixed meanings of words as
embodied within the Evidence Act.
11.61 Even though the courts are bound by the plain meaning of
words unless an ambiguity or absurdity ensues after considering the
extrinsic evidence, a related issue is whether recourse to extrinsic
evidence is permissible in the first place where there is no ambiguity or
absurdity on the face of the contractual words. Two High Court
decisions appeared to think that recourse to extrinsic evidence in such a
case is not permissible. First, Choo Han Teck J in Healthcare Supply
Chain stated that the Court of Appeal in Zurich Insurance "clearly could
not be saying that if the plain language of a contract is clear[,] one
should start looking for extrinsic evidence - which might result in
rendering the clear language unclear": Healthcare Supply Chain at [6].
Secondly, although it is not entirely clear from the judgment, Lai Siu
Chiu J in the High Court decision of Morten Innhaug v Sinwa SS (HK)
Co Ltd [2011] SGHC 20 ("Morten") appeared to come to the same
conclusion: Morten at [41]. It is respectfully submitted that this position
may need to be reconsidered.
1.62 In the first place, the Court of Appeal in Zurich Insurance clearly
stated that "ambiguity is not a prerequisite for the admissibility of
extrinsic evidence under provision (J) to s 94 [of the Evidence Act
(1997 Rev Ed)]": Zurich Insurance at [132]. Indeed, extrinsic evidence
has always been admissible to raise a latent ambiguity (see, eg, Thomas v
Thomas 6 TR 617); the prohibition, as introduced by s 95 of the
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Evidence Act, is that extrinsic evidence is not admissible to explain away
a patent ambiguity.
11.63 Before leaving the general principles governing contractual
interpretation in Singapore, one might raise the specific issue of the
admissibility of prior negotiations and subsequent conduct in the
interpretation of contracts. The Court of Appeal in Zurich Insurance,
while finding academic arguments in favour of the admissibility of
such evidence favourable, declined to affirmatively embrace their
admissibility. This has left the exclusionary rule against prior
negotiations and subsequent conduct intact in Singapore, with the result
that lower courts have had to consider the admissibility of such
evidence.
11.64 In Sheng Siong Supermarket v Carilla Pte Ltd [2011] 4 SLR 1094
("Sheng Siong") the High Court had to consider whether an "inchoate"
version of the final contract was admissible because it appeared to
constitute evidence of "prior negotiations". The facts of this case are set
out in greater detail below (at para 11.88). To circumvent the
inadmissibility of evidence of prior negotiations, Andrew Ang J
characterised the inchoate contract as a product of prior negotiations: it
was a "post negotiation" document, and was thus not inadmissible.
However, this reasoning, with respect, offends the general rule in
English law that earlier drafts of the final contract are not admissible,
which rule is in fact a specific example of the rule against "prior
negotiations". The exclusionary rule is not in fact narrowly applicable to
"prior negotiations" only but, rather, against "pre-contractual evidence"
(although that definition might, in turn, be too broad). The rationale is
that these documents, concluded before the final contract, are not
helpful towards the interpretation of contracts, probably because they
show the subjective intentions of the parties. Therefore, the High
Court's reasoning in Sheng Siong, while overcoming the exclusionary
rule on a technical basis, does not answer the fundamental objection
against the admission of such evidence. Whether a document originated
during negotiations or after, the more important question is whether it
originated before the contract was formed. It is suggested that such
technical characterisations would not be needed if there were to be a
definitive rejection of the exclusionary rule by the Court of Appeal.
That, though, remains to be seen.
Contra proferentum rule
11.65 In the High Court decision of LTT Global Consultants v BMC
Academy Pte Ltd [2011] 3 SLR 903 ("LTT Global Consultants"), Judith
Prakash J stated that there are two stages in deciding whether to apply
the contra proferentum rule. The first stage involves determining
whether there is an ambiguity in the contract that cannot be resolved by
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interpreting the term in the context of the overall contract. The contra
proferentum rule may only apply in the presence of such ambiguity and
cannot be used to create an ambiguity where none existed. The corollary
principle is that if the term is clear and free of ambiguity, then the contra
proferentum rule will not apply, as was the case in the High Court
decision of JK Pte Ltd v Lonpac Insurance Bhd [2011] SGHC 72 at [82].
11.66 The second stage in deciding whether to apply the contra
proferentum rule, as stated by Judith Prakash J in LTT Global
Consultants, involves identifying the person ("proferens") against whose
interest the ambiguous term should be read. In this regard, if both
parties were involved in the drafting of the contract, there would be no
proferens with the result that the contra proferentum rule cannot be
applied. Prakash J further stated that it is harder to apply the rule to the
case of contracts that have been individually negotiated. In contrast, the
rule applies more readily in standard form contracts, especially where
one side puts forward the contract on "take it or leave it" terms. LTT
Global Consultants itself involved a negotiated contract. In that case,
since the parties had every opportunity to raise their individual
concerns during the negotiations, Prakash J decided that the contra
proferentum rule did not apply.
Interpretation and operation of exception clauses
11.67 In the High Court decision of Ho See Jui (trading as Xuanhua
Art Gallery) v Liquid Advertising Pte Ltd [2011] SGHC 108 ("Ho See
Jui"), Lai Siu Chiu J considered the principles governing the
interpretation of exception clauses. Her Honour held that there were
two relevant principles in that case (Ho See Jui at [92]):
First, the exemption clause must specifically cover the contingency or
loss for which exemption is sought ... Second, the exemption clause
will be construed contra proferentum.
11.68 Applying these principles, Lai J found that the exception clause
concerned did not cover the contingency concerned and hence was
ineffective. This illustrates the threshold question of interpretation
which underlies the application of every exception clause. In any event,
her Honour also found that because the party against whom the
exception clause was sought to be enforced was dealing as a consumer,
s 7(2) read with s 12 of the UCTA prevented the exemption of liability
for the quality of the product concerned (a water inlet hose) and its
fitness for the particular purpose for which it was supplied.
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Vitiating factors
Illegality
Restraint of trade
11.69 A covenant in restraint of trade conventionally takes the form of
an express prohibition against taking up employment with or interest in
a competitor of the employer. At common law, such clauses are void
unless shown to be reasonable. In Mano Vikrant Singh v Cargill TSF Asia
Pte Ltd [2012] 1 SLR 311 ("Mano Vikrant"), the issue was whether this
doctrine would also apply to contractual provisions that do not
expressly prohibit competition, but which have the effect of restricting
an employee's freedom to trade. This may arise when an employer seeks
to retain key employees by promising attractive financial incentives
(such as bonus payments or shares) that vest over a period of time but
specifically provides that the employee would lose his entitlement if he
competes with the employer ("Forfeiture-for-Competition Clauses").
Benefits that have yet to vest are thus forfeited. In the alternative,
the contract may simply provide that the employee would forfeit his
benefits if he resigns ("Payment-for- Loyalty Clauses"). Clearly, both
types of provisions impose some measure of constraint on the
employee's freedom to join a competitor or take up alternative
employment - are they therefore unlawful restraints of trade? Steven
Chong J held they were not.
11.70 The plaintiff in this case was employed by the defendant as its
senior trader. It was a term of employment that the plaintiff entered into
a non-compete agreement ("Non-Compete Agreement") under which
he agreed, inter alia, not to compete with the defendant for a period
of one year after the termination of his employment. The plaintiff
also agreed, at his own option, to the defendant's incentive award
plan ("Incentive Award Plan"). Under this plan, he would be paid
discretionary incentive awards "based on individual, team and business
unit results". However, 50% of the incentive award would be paid out as
a cash award ("Cash Payments") while the balance would be paid over a
period of one to three fiscal years ("Deferred Incentive Payments"), the
precise duration of which was to be determined based on the quantum
of the award. Significantly, the Incentive Award Plan contained a
provision ("Forfeiture Provision") stating that the Deferred Incentive
Payments that had yet to be paid would be forfeited if the employee
engaged in any competing activity within a period of two years after
leaving the defendant's employment. The Forfeiture Provision was
therefore a clear instance of a Forfeiture-for-Competition Clause. Unlike
the Non-Compete Agreement, the terms of the Incentive Award Plan
were not obligatory. Had the plaintiff not agreed to the plan, he would
still have been entitled to the Cash Payments, but not the Deferred
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Incentive Payments. Sometime in July 2007, the plaintiff set up a
company that engaged in a competing business and he resigned from
the defendant's employment in November 2008. In consequence,
the defendant forfeited the Deferred Incentive Payments that were
declared, but not due for payment prior to his resignation, totalling
US$1,741,894. The plaintiff then brought proceedings to recover the
forfeited payments, arguing that the Forfeiture Provision was in
substance a restraint of trade which was unreasonable and therefore
void.
11.71 After reviewing numerous authorities from the UK, Australia
and the United States, Chong J concluded that the Forfeiture Provision
was not a restraint of trade. The test to apply was whether the provision
would "cause the plaintiff 'to refuse business which otherwise he would
take', or 'would diminish his prospects of employment"' (Mano Vikrant
at [60], citing Stenhouse Australia Ltd v Marshall William Davidson
Phillips [1974] WLR 134 at 141). The Forfeiture Provision did not so
affect the plaintiff. All it did was to provide a financial disincentive for
competing with the defendant. In effect, therefore, the plaintiff "had the
choice of preserving his rights under the Incentive Payment Plan by
refraining from competition with the defendant or risk forfeiture of his
deferred bonus by exercising his right to compete": Mano Vikrant
at [58]. Having at the material time full knowledge of the Forfeiture
Provision, the plaintiff in deciding to compete must have made
"a calculated business decision" that it was financially advantageous to
do so notwithstanding the forfeiture of the unpaid bonus. Therefore,
Chong J took the view that (Mano Vikrant at [58]):
It seems to me that there is no compelling public policy that requires
the court to intervene to hold the Forfeiture Provision as in restraint
of trade when in truth there was no restraint in form or substance to
speak of. The plaintiff was completely at liberty to compete with the
defendant and had in fact done so when he set up a competing
business in Xangbo. There is therefore no question of society being
deprived of his skill and competency which is the cornerstone behind
the restraint of trade doctrine.
11.72 Chong J also observed that had the outcome been otherwise, the
law would have placed unjustifiable weight on the freedom to trade at
the expense of the parties' freedom to contract. While there can be no
inherent objection to opportunistic conduct on the part of employees, it
is equally legitimate for employers to protect themselves against such
opportunism. Forfeiture-for-Competition clauses are designed to do
just that. Moreover, these provisions do not always work to the
employees' disadvantage. On the contrary, the anticipated loss of
incentives may even enable the employees to bargain for more
favourable terms in their new employment.
Contract Law 209
(2011) 12 SAL Ann Rev
11.73 The same reasoning would, according to Chong J, apply to
Payment-for- Loyalty Clauses (although no such clause arose for
consideration on the facts). Like Forfeiture-For-Competition Clauses,
Payment- For-Loyalty Clauses do not explicitly prohibit an employee
from working for others, but provide a disincentive for leaving the
employer. In fact, such clauses have more overreaching effects since an
employee who resigns would have his benefits forfeited whether or not
he also competes with the employer. Even so, case law has consistently
held that such clauses were not restraints of trade. In Chong J's view,
this must be correct as there is no logical distinction between Forfeiture-
for-Competition and Payment-for-Loyalty Clauses. This should be
contrasted with the position in the UK where the former, but not the
latter, category of clauses are generally characterised as unlawful
restraints of trade.
11.74 Though not strictly necessary, Chong J also went on to find that
the Forfeiture Provision would not satisfy the test of reasonableness if it
were a restraint of trade clause. This was because the Forfeiture
Provision had a longer than necessary tenure, covered geographical
areas beyond its countries of operation, and extended to businesses it
was not involved in.
11.75 There can be little doubt that the correct result was obtained in
this case. It is generally the practice that employees who resign before
bonus payments vest stand to lose such benefits. This was so even
though the payments were in substance remuneration for work done
before resignation. That such payments were "deferred" clearly has some
deterrent effect on employees contemplating a change in employment.
However, no one would seriously argue that such practice constitutes a
restraint on trade. Of course, the clauses considered in Mano Vikrant are
more severe in effects. Substantial sums may be deferred, not just for
months, but for longer periods of one or more years. Even so, it must (as
Chong J observed) be open to employers to devise financial incentives to
entice employees to stay. This is so particularly where an affected
employee is high-ranking and had, at the material time, adequate
bargaining power so that he could have turned to alternative
employment had he thought the deferral unreasonable. That said, if the
substance of the test is one of restraint, then it may be that one could
not be categorical that Forfeiture-for-Competition and Payment-for-
Loyalty clauses would never be restraints of trade. The circumstances
and effects of the provisions will have to be examined. A different result
may conceivably be obtained where the employee in question had little
or no bargaining power, and the effect of the forfeiture is prohibitive in
the sense it would result in him being patently under-compensated for
the work done.
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11.76 Smile Inc Dental Surgeons Pte Ltd v Lui Andrew Stewart [2011]
SGHC 266 ("Smile Inc") was another decision that examined the
restraint of trade doctrine. Here, a dental clinic sued its former
employee for the breach of a number of contractual provisions,
including, inter alia, an undertaking not to compete with the plaintiff
within 3 km of its clinics ("Radial Clause"), not to solicit its patients
("Non- Solicitation Clause") and not to deal with its patients
("Non-Dealing Clause"). The defendant resisted these claims on the
ground that the clauses pleaded were unlawful restraints of trade and
therefore unenforceable. Woo Bih Li J held for the defendant.
11.77 The starting point, according to Woo J (Smile Inc at [67]), was
the three-limb test set out by the Court of Appeal in Man Financial (S)
Pte Ltd v Wong Bark Chuan David [2008] 1 SLR(R) 663:
(a) Is there a legitimate proprietary interest to be protected?
(b) Is the restrictive covenant reasonable in reference to the interests
of the parties?
(c) Is the restrictive covenant reasonable in reference to the interests
of the public?
11.78 Applying this test, Woo J found, firstly, that the plaintiff had the
relevant proprietary interest to protect because the plaintiff had little
"institutional hold" over the patients treated by the defendant. All things
(such as price and convenience) being equal, those who were happy with
the defendant's services would likely follow him to a competing set up.
However, the court went on to find that the Radial Clause was
unreasonable with reference to the parties' interests because it was too
wide in scope - the 3 km radius applied not only to the clinic at which
the defendant had practised ("Forum Clinic"), but also to all other
clinics of the plaintiff. Even if the clause were severed so that its
application were confined to the Forum Clinic, it was still unreasonable
to the extent that it attempted to prevent the defendant from competing
with the plaintiff for new patients. The Radial Clause was also unlimited
in time. Although this would not ipso facto render the clause
unreasonable, the fact that a dentist's rapport with his patients would
normally wear out after two or three years was evidence that its duration
was excessive.
11.79 Interestingly, Woo J also declined the plaintiff's invitation to
uphold the clause through "discretionary severance". This novel
approach emanated from Transport North American Express Inc v
New Solutions Financial Corp (2001) 200 DLR (4th) 560 ("TNAE"),
a decision of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice. There, Cullity J took
the view that the doctrine of severance is not limited to the striking out
of offensive elements (ie, by applying the blue-pencil test), but may
include the "reading down" of a provision so as to render it lawful in
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scope and effects. In an oft-cited passage, Cullity J observed that (TNAE
at [35]-[36]):
The blue-pencil test is, I believe, a relic of a bygone era when the
attitude of courts of common law - unassisted by principles of equity -
towards the interpretation and enforcement of contracts was more
rigid than is the case at the present time. At an early stage in the
development of the law relating to illegal promises, severance was held
to be justified on the basis of the blue-pencil test alone ... we have
moved a long way beyond that mechanical approach. Enforcement
may be refused in the exercise of the kind of discretionary judgment I
have mentioned even where blue-pencil severance is possible.
Despite repeated statements in the cases that the court will not make a
new agreement for the parties, that is, of course, exactly what it does
whenever severance is permitted ...
11.80 This concept of discretionary severance was rejected on appeal
by the majority of the Ontario Court of Appeal (see Transport North
American Express Inc v New Solutions Financial Corp (2002) 214 DLR
(4th) 44), but was accepted by the dissenting judge, Sharpe JA. In Man
Financial (S) Pte Ltd v Wong Bark Chuan David [2008] 1 SLR(R) 663
("Man Financial"), Andrew Phang JA noted (Man Financial at [1291),
these developments, but found it unnecessary to form any concluded
view on the matter. In Smile Inc, however, Woo J pointed out that TNAE
could be distinguished on its facts because the court there was not
dealing with a restraint of trade clause, but a provision in a loan
agreement that prescribed a higher rate of interest than that permitted
by statute. Moreover, the learned judge did not think discretionary
severance should be applied to "save" an unlawful restraint of trade
clause. He explained (Smile Inc at [122]):
Generally speaking, I do not favour the discretionary severance
approach for employment contracts. If employers want to protect
their trade connections or pool of clients, customers or patients then
they would do well to draft a reasonable restraint of trade provision
rather than to try and get the maximum protection which their
employees will agree to. The discretionary severance approach will
only encourage employers to try their luck by initially imposing the
maximum protection they can get an employee to agree to and then to
rely on a reading down of the provision when confronted with the
likelihood of an unfavourable result in court. Moreover, not every
employee will have the courage or resources to resist the threats of an
employer to comply with a restraint of trade provision.
11.81 These are clearly pertinent considerations. It is true that the
blue-pencil test is deficient in that it may be used to rewrite agreements
in an arbitrary manner (for much is dependent on the accident of the
language used by the drafter), but that is not a sufficient reason for
embracing notional severance. The context to which severance is applied
should also be considered. Given the inequality of bargaining power that
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is inherent in most employment contracts, a development that tilts
the balance further in favour of the employer is difficult to defend.
Indeed, this context-sensitive approach also appears to have been
endorsed in Canada. So although the Canadian Supreme Court has in
New Solutions Financial Corp v Transport North American Express Inc
(2004) 235 (4th) 385 reversed the decision of the Court of Appeal and
held a court may apply discretionary or notional severance to identify
the best cures for the illegality in question, the same court has
subsequently held in Morley Shafron v KRG Insurance Brokers (Western)
Inc [2009] BCWLD 700 ("Morley Shafron") that this approach had no
place in the enforcement of restraint of trade clauses. Rothstein J (who
delivered the decision of the court) gave two reasons for this view. The
first is that in a contract of employment, unlike a contract for a loan,
there is usually no bright line test for reasonableness. As his Honour
explained (Morley Shafron at [39]):
In the case of an unreasonable restrictive covenant, while the parties
may not have had the common intention that the covenant be
unreasonable, there is no objective bright-line rule that can be applied
in all cases to render the covenant reasonable. Applying notional
severance in these circumstances simply amounts to the court
rewriting the covenant in a manner that it subjectively considers
reasonable in each individual case. Such an approach creates
uncertainty as to what may be found to be reasonable in any specific
case.
The second reason identified by Rothstein J is similar to the policy
concern articulated by Woo J in Smile Inc, viz, that the law ought not to
unduly favour employers who already enjoy superior bargaining power.
Specifically, the doctrine of notional severance is problematic because
(Morley Shafron at [40]):
It invites the employer to impose an unreasonable restrictive covenant
on the employee with the only sanction being that if the covenant is
found to be unreasonable, the court will still enforce it to the extent of
what might validly have been agreed to.
And this is an unsatisfactory position because (Morley Shafron at [411):
Not only would the use of notional severance change the terms of the
covenant from the parties' initial agreement to what the court thinks
they should have agreed to, it would also change the risks assumed by
the parties. The restrictive covenant is sought by the employer. The
obligation is on the employee. Having regard to the generally accepted
imbalance of power between employers and employees, to introduce
the doctrine of notional severance to read down an unreasonable
restrictive covenant to what is reasonable provides no inducement to
an employer to ensure the reasonableness of the covenant and
inappropriately increases the risk that the employee will be forced to
abide by an unreasonable covenant.
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11.82 Returning to the decision in Smile Inc, Woo J proceeded
to examine the Non-Solicitation and Non-Dealing Clauses. The
Non-Solicitation Clause was too broad as it included patients of the
plaintiff whom the defendant had never treated. Even more onerous was
the Non-Dealing Clause, which (based on the plaintiff's pleading)
prohibited the defendant from dealing with any of the plaintiff's
patients, whether or not he had solicited their custom. Both clauses were
also unlimited in time. These considerations led the learned judge to
conclude that both clauses were unreasonable and void.
Illegality and restitutionary recovery under void contracts
11.83 The Court of Appeal's decision in Aqua Art Pte Ltd v Goodman
Development (S) Pte Ltd [2011] 2 SLR 865 - reversing Aqua Art Pte Ltd v
Goodman Development (S) Pte Ltd [2010] 4 SLR 86 - was previously
discussed in (2010) 11 SAL Ann Rev 239 at para 11.77 onwards. For
comments on the restitutionary remedies granted in this case, see
paras 21.28-21.35 of this issue.
Discharge of contract
Discharge by agreement: Force majeure clauses
11.84 The important case of Holcim (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Precise
Development Pte Ltd [2011] 2 SLR 106 has now been officially reported.
The analysis of the Court of Appeal in this case was discussed (and some
of its conclusions queried) previously in (2010) 11 SAL Ann Rev 239
at paras 11.90-11.104.
Discharge by frustration
11.85 A difficult issue arises in connection with the possible discharge
of a contract by frustration when the so-called frustrating event affects
not the possibility or practicability of performance of the contract, but
the purposes for which the contract was entered into, particularly where
the literal performance of the contractual obligations set out in the
contract is still possible. It is clear that in many cases, a contract will be
entered into by the contracting parties to achieve certain purposes
which each party may have. In some cases, it may be possible for the
courts to identify that a contract had been entered into for certain
purposes which were held in common by both contracting parties. In
such cases, it appears to be possible for the contract to be discharged by
frustration if the effect of the frustrating event is to prevent some of
those commonly held purposes to be achieved.
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11.86 An example to illustrate this might be found in the seminal
decision of Taylor v Caldwell (1863) 3 B & S 826, 122 ER 309 ("Taylor v
Caldwell"). One could take the view that Taylor v Caldwell should be
read as a case of discharge by frustration of the common purpose of the
contracting parties, the common purpose being that an entire package
of entertainments, comprising of concerts in a music hall and other
activities in its surrounds, be held on the grounds in question, when the
music hall was subsequently destroyed by fire. Doubtless, the attractions
of the activities in the gardens surrounding the hall would be severely
dampened if they were to take place next to a fire-blackened husk.
Though literal performance of the contract was still possible, such
performance would not have been consistent with fulfilment of the
common purposes of the contracting parties, at least part of which would
no longer be capable of being fulfilled.
11.87 A possible local example to illustrate the relative willingness of
the courts to permit a contract to be discharged by frustration when the
common purposes of the contracting parties to a contract have been
thwarted (even if partially) by the occurrence of some external event
may be found in the High Court decision in Sheng Siong Supermarket v
Carilla Pte Ltd [2011] 4 SLR 1094 ("Sheng Siong Supermarket").
11.88 In this case, the defendant ("Carilla") acquired a lease of
commercial premises of whom the reversionary owner was the Housing
Development Board ("HDB"). Carilla sought to sub-let the premises to
the plaintiff ("Sheng Siong"). The terms of the lease expressly provided
that the premises were to be used for certain specified purposes,
including the operation of a supermarket and food court. Though both
parties were conscious that such usage of the premises would be subject
to approval by the HDB as reversionary owner, and indeed, in some
pre-contract communications, Sheng Siong had alerted Carilla that it
would only enter into the lease on the basis that such approval be
granted, the terms of the lease did not expressly provide that it was
Carilla's responsibility to obtain such approval. Nor did the lease
documentation provide that the sub-lease was to come to an end should
the said HDB approval be withheld (ie, there was no express wording
stipulating that Sheng Siong's entry into and continued performance of
the obligations under that sub-lease were contingent upon the HDB
providing the requisite approval).
11.89 In a somewhat confusing judgment, given the context in which
agreement was reached, the learned trial judge reasoned that it was
possible to construe the contract contained in the lease documentation
as also having expressly provided for such a condition subsequent.
Oddly, the learned judge then reasoned that this meant that the contract
was discharged by frustration in light of the HDB's refusal to grant its
approval. With respect, this part of the reasoning of the trial judge is
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probably in error. If there had been an express (or, for that matter,
implied) condition subsequent, the contract would not have come to an
end on account of the occurrence of a supervening event of which
the contracting parties had made no contractual provision. If it were
right to conclude that the contract between Sheng Siong and Carilla
contained an express term operating as a condition subsequent, upon
the occurrence of that stipulated event, the contract would have been
discharged by virtue of the parties' agreement. It would not, therefore, be
open to conclude that the contract had been discharged by frustration.
11.90 However, based on the facts before the court in Sheng Siong
Supermarket, one could take the view that there was, arguably, only a
promissory condition on the part of Sheng Siong that it would operate a
supermarket and food court at the leased premises, and that there had
been no provision that HDB approval was to operate as a condition
subsequent (ie, the relevant term was merely a promissory term and not
a contingent one). If so, it would follow, arguably, that the contract
under the lease could have been frustrated in light of the HDB's
subsequent decision not to approve change of the use of the premises
as a supermarket and food court. Though still capable of literal
performance, were Sheng Siong to operate a supermarket and food
court in the leased premises (as it had promised Carilla it would, on the
assumption that there was only a promissory obligation to use the
premises in the manner specified), once the HDB made clear its position
that it would not approve usage of the premises in this manner, such
performance by Sheng Siong would run counter to the initial, common,
understanding between the parties that it would be possible to operate a
supermarket and food court in the premises without exposing the
parties to the risks associated with using the premises in a manner
which violated the terms of Carilla's lease with the HDB. It would
follow, then, that the court was right to conclude that that contract had
been frustrated by reason of the HDB's refusal to grant its approval for
the proposed use of the premises.
11.91 For completeness' sake, it may also be noted that (Sheng Siong
Supermarket at [80]), having found that the contract for the grant of a
sub-lease of commercial premises had been discharged by frustration,
the learned judge ordered a refund of sums of money that had been
paid by Sheng Siong to Carilla in reliance on s 2(2) of the Frustrated
Contracts Act (Cap 115, 1985 Rev Ed). However, perhaps somewhat
unusually, instead of going on to apply the proviso to s 2(2) to permit
Carilla to retain out of those sums which had been paid to it, such
expenses as it had reasonably incurred in attempted performance of its
obligations under the contract prior to its discharge, the learned judge
held that (Sheng Siong Supermarket at [801):
... pursuant to s 2(3), whatever were the expenses incurred by
[Carilla] in relation to the [alteration and amendment] works and
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preparation of the proposal submitted to the [Housing Development
Board ('HDB') as reversionary owner] (eg, in developing the plans
submitted to the HDB, engaging the firm of architects, etc) should be
subtracted from this sum. [emphasis added]
11.92 The grounds of decision do not explain why the learned judge
thought it necessary to rely on s 2(3) rather than the proviso to s 2(2) to
take into account expenses which had been incurred by Carilla. It may
be that on the facts of the case, either s 2(3) or the proviso to s 2(2)
could have been relied upon to similar effect. However, the two
provisions operate in distinctly different ways. For one, the proviso to
s 2(2) is entirely concerned with making provision for expenses which
had been incurred by the party against whom a claim for recovery
of monies under s 2(2) had been made: it is immaterial that no
non-money benefits might have been conferred upon the claimant. In
contrast, s 2(3) is not specifically focused upon expenses incurred - it is
focused upon non-money benefits which had been conferred by one
party upon the other. If such benefits had been conferred, s 2(3)
requires the court to value those benefits in money terms, before
granting the court a discretion to award a sum of money (the "just
sum") not exceeding that value to provide a form of statutory
restitution for the non-money benefits that had been granted under the
frustrated contract.
Remedies
Causation of loss for breach of contract
11.93 In addition to certain observations about the operation of the
doctrine of estoppel by convention (mentioned briefly in (2010) 11 SAL
Ann Rev 239 at para 11.20), and apart from dealing with the issue of
implication of terms in fact (discussed at para 11.29 above), the High
Court in the case of ABN AMRO Bank NV Singapore Branch v CWT
Commodities (SEA) Pte Ltd [2011] 2 SLR 891 ("ABNAMRO Bank NV")
also made some observations on remedies. First, it reiterated the point
that the burden lies upon the party who seeks to recover for its loss for
breach of contract to show that such loss had been caused by the breach:
ABNAMRO Bank NV at [121]-[130].
11.94 To better understand the court's comments on the pertinent
judicial remedies which arose in the case before it, it is necessary to
supplement the brief statement of the facts previously set out at
para 11.29 above. In this case, the plaintiff bank engaged the defendant
warehouse company to act as a "collateral manager" for tin products
which were pledged to the plaintiff as security for trade financing that
had been granted to Singapore Tin Industries Pte Ltd ("STI"). The
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arrangement required the defendant to issue receipts and certificates
of quality to the plaintiff for the pledged goods (which included a tin
by-product known as "tin dross"). The receipts would notify the
plaintiff that a certain type and quantity of goods had been received by
the defendant, and the certificates of quality confirmed the minimum
tin content of such goods as had been received. The plaintiff required
the defendant to issue a receipt and a certificate of quality for every
batch of goods delivered into the defendant's custody before making the
decision to grant STI financing for that particular batch.
11.95 When the plaintiff instructed the defendant to release certain
batches of tin dross to STI for sale, instead of taking physical delivery of
the tin dross, STI would leave the tin dross in the defendant's warehouse
and would then re-pledge such tin dross as fresh collateral. The
defendant would then issue new receipts and certificates of quality for
such tin dross as had been left in its warehouse along with new tin dross
which STI placed in the defendant's custody. It was subsequently
discovered that STI had perpetrated a fraud on the plaintiff. Instead of
buying and selling tin dross to third parties, all the tin dross that had
been pledged to the plaintiff had been produced by STI itself and had
been left to accumulate in the defendant's warehouse. When STI
defaulted on its loans, the plaintiff sought to realise its security in the tin
dross that had been left in the defendant's custody - but this was
fruitless as it transpired that the dross was contaminated with lead.
Disposal of the contaminated tin dross cost the plaintiff S$104,680.
Over and above that, the plaintiff had advanced monies to STI on the
security of the tin dross of which US$10.6m was still outstanding. The
plaintiff sought to recover both these heads of loss from the defendant
on the ground that it had breached its contractual obligation to inform
the bank that there had been no physical movement of the tin dross
from its warehouse.
11.96 Although the court awarded damages in respect of the
additional disposal costs, it rejected the claim for the US$10.6m. Woo
Bih Li J pointed out that here, the onus lay on the plaintiff to prove that
had it been informed of the lack of physical movement of tin dross, it
would not have made the decision to forward monies to STI on the security
of the tin dross. This it failed to do. Accordingly, its claim for the sum of
US$10.6m being loans which had been made to STI and which were still
outstanding failed for want of proof of causation. Woo J pointed out
that it was conceivable that, by failing to inform the plaintiff of the lack
of physical movement of the tin dross, it might have been possible for
the plaintiff to prove that such failure had caused it to lose the chance to
seek an explanation from STI and thence to review its own position as
to whether to continue to provide trade financing to STI. However, the
plaintiff had made no such pleading. Accordingly, Woo J rejected the
plaintiff's allegation that it would have terminated the financing
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arrangement with STI and would not have incurred the US$10.6m
loss in terms of unpaid advances to STI: ABN AMRO Bank NV
at [121]-[130]. It followed, therefore, that the claim for the US$10.6m
had to fail.
Remoteness and quantification of loss for breach of contract
11.97 In ABN AMRO Bank NV, the High Court also followed
the position taken by the Court of Appeal in MFM Restaurants Pte
Ltd v Fish & Co Restaurant Pte Ltd [2011] 1 SLR 150 ("MFM
Restaurants") (discussed previously in (2010) 11 SAL Ann Rev 239
at paras 11.123-11.126). Accepting that the Court of Appeal had in that
case (MFM Restaurants at [134]ff), definitively settled the law on
remoteness of loss, Woo J declined to apply the "additional legal
criterion of assumption of responsibility introduced by Lord Hoffmann
in Transfield Shipping Inc v Mercator Inc [2009] 1 AC 61": ABN AMRO
Bank NV at [134]. Had causation been established, Woo J was of the
view that the plaintiff's US$10.6m financing loss would not have been
too remote as "[it was reasonably contemplated that the [plaintiff]
would finance the tin dross based on the security of the [receipts] and
[certificates of quality] issued by [the defendant]": ABN AMRO Bank
NVat [135].
11.98 But for its failure to establish factual causation for this head of
loss, it would then have been necessary for the court to proceed to
quantify the plaintiff's loss in relation to the US$10.6m in unpaid
advances - and this, too, would be a matter for which the burden of
proof lay on the plaintiff. However, the court found that the bank would
also have failed on this point, holding that the plaintiff, "did not know
what it was doing especially when it came to tin dross. It simply agreed
to an arbitrary formula to determine the amount to be advanced on the
security of tin dross ... without even establishing the objective value of
tin dross with such tin content as stated in the [certificates of quality]":
ABN AMRO Bank NV at [ 149 ].
11.99 Another interesting decision which reiterated the Court of
Appeal's rejection of Lord Hoffman's approach in Transfield Shipping Inc v
Mercator Inc (The Achilleas) [2009] 1 AC 61 may be found in the
grounds of decision handed down by the assistant registrar in the
assessment of damages in Out of the Box Pte Ltd v Wanin Industries Pte
Ltd [2011] SGHC 226 ("Out of the Box"). Here, the plaintiff company
had engaged the defendant company to produce a sports drink called
"18" which the plaintiff had formulated and conceptualised. The drinks
which were manufactured and supplied by the defendant to the
plaintiff's formula were defective in that they would change colour and
contained foreign particles or insects. Following consumer complaints,
the relevant food safety authorities in Singapore issued a public warning
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against consumption of "18" and directed that all stock be recalled from
the market. The result of this was to irretrievably damage the "18"
brand.
11.100 Having obtained summary judgment against the defendant for
having breached its obligations under its contract with the plaintiff, the
plaintiff sought to recover damages in respect of its loss as measured on
the reliance basis - ie, the expenses it had incurred which had been
wasted as a result of the defendant's breach. The chief component of
these expenses related to its advertising and promotional expenses
which, on the plaintiff's reckoning, came up to just over S$700,000.
11.101 The defendant's chief objection to being made liable for this
type of loss was that such loss was too remote: the quantum was so large
in light of the limited contract value for the drinks supplied that it was
beyond the reasonable contemplation of the parties. The learned
assistant registrar noted that in principle, it was enough that the type of
loss had been within reasonable contemplation, though not the precise
detail or quantum of the damage. However, the learned assistant
registrar also accepted that "the concept of a type of loss is a fluid one
and the appropriate characterisation of the type of loss suffered will
depend heavily on the particular set of facts before the court", noting
that even in Victoria Laundry v Newman [1949] 2 KB 528, the English
Court of Appeal had differentiated between two types of loss of profit -
one, the loss of profits from laundry operations and two, the loss of
profits from an especially lucrative dyeing contract for a government
ministry: Out of the Box at [47].
11.102 In similar vein, the learned assistant registrar was of the view
that the category "advertising and promotion expenses" could be
characterised to be of two different types given the circumstances of the
case: domestic (nationwide), as compared with non-domestic (regional
or worldwide), given that, "[t]he strategy and concept, the mediums
[sic] used for advertising, the market research, the type of launch events,
and even the models used in a regional or worldwide advertising
campaign would all likely be different from that from a nationwide
advertising campaign": Out of the Box at [52]. Significantly for the
plaintiff, the learned assistant registrar held that nationwide expenses
would fall under the first limb of Hadley v Baxendale (1854) 156 ER 145,
9 Exch 341, whereas regional and worldwide expenses would fall under
the second limb. As such, since the plaintiff had not demonstrated that
the defendant had had actual knowledge of its plans to promote "18"
beyond Singapore's shores, its regional and worldwide advertising and
promotional expenses would be too remote and was thus, irrecoverable.
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Burden of proof to show a "bad bargain" and its effect on recovery for
loss quantified on the reliance measure
11.103 In Out of the Box at [56]-[57], the learned assistant registrar
also provided a useful reminder as to the burden of proof vis-h-vis the
need to establish whether the plaintiff had made a "bad bargain" with
the defendant:
Where the claim is for 'reliance loss', there is one further limitation to
the full recovery of loss that is both validly incurred and not too
remote. As held in CCC Films (London) v Impact Quadrant Films
[1985] QB 16 ('CCC Films') at 32, a plaintiff should only be entitled to
recover its wasted expenditure to the extent that such expenses could
have been recovered if the contract had been properly performed.
In this regard, Hutchison J went on to state, at 40, that where a
defendant's breach prevents the plaintiff from exploiting the subject
matter of the contract, it would be fair to place the burden of proving
that the plaintiff would not recoup its expenditure on the defendant.
The present case is similar to CCC Films. By supplying the plaintiff
with defective '18', the defendant had caused the plaintiff to
discontinue '18' after less than 4 months in the market, thereby
making it impossible for the plaintiff to prove the amount of profits it
would have earned. As such, the burden should be on the defendant to
prove, on the balance of probabilities, that the plaintiff would not have
recouped the advertising expenses even if the defendant had not
breached the contract.
11.104 To establish that the plaintiff had made a "bad bargain", the
defendant relied on the sales figures for "18" during the four months
it had been on the market before its recall, multiplying it to obtain
an estimate of total sales had "18" been on the market for the full two
years for which the defendant had been contractually obligated to
manufacture the drink. In the judgment of the assistant registrar, this
was insufficient to satisfy the burden of proof placed on the defendant
as it did not factor in potential sales growth. Further, the two-year
contract period was only a minimum period. Citing the decision of
the High Court of Australia in Commonwealth of Australia v Amann
Aviation (1991) 66 ALJR 123 with approval, the assistant registrar noted
that "the prospect of securing a renewal of a contract can be properly
taken into account in a determination of whether the plaintiff would
have recouped its expenditure had the contract been properly
performed": Out of the Box at [58].
Specific remedies: The equitable remedy of specific performance
11.105 The High Court's decision in E C Investment Holding Pte Ltd v
Ridout Residence Pte Ltd [2011] 2 SLR 232 was discussed at some length
previously (see (2010) 11 SAL Ann Rev 239 at paras 11.155-11.164). In
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that prior discussion, mention was made of the appeal to the Court of
Appeal on the issue of the availability of specific performance, and the
hope that greater clarity might be provided on appeal as to whether the
grant of specific performance to remedy breaches of contracts for the
sale of land ought to depend (at least in some part) on whether the
party seeking to enforce the contract had intended to acquire the land in
question for investment or other purposes.
11.106 The plaintiff company's appeal against Quentin Loh J's decision
at first instance was heard by the Court of Appeal on 15 March 2011 and
judgment was handed down on 28 September 2011. That decision has
now been reported: see E C Investment Holding Pte Ltd v Ridout
Residence Pte Ltd [2012] 1 SLR 32 ("E C Investment").
11.107 Responding to the five grounds relied upon by the learned judge
at first instance to support his conclusion that this was not an
appropriate case to issue an order of specific performance against the
defendant company which had declined to complete conveyance of the
subject property despite the plaintiff company's exercise of its option to
acquire that property, Chao Hick Tin JA (delivering the judgment of the
court) clearly reversed the finding that the plaintiff company ("ECI")
had not approached the court with clean hands because of the very low
purchase price for the property and was for that reason barred from
obtaining an order of specific performance in its favour (E C Investment
at [103]), although it agreed that the lower court had rightly declined to
make the order of specific performance which ECI had sought.
11.108 In respect of the other grounds relied upon by Loh J to come to
that conclusion, however, Chao JA noted as follows (E C Investment
at [103]):
In coming to this conclusion [not to make the order of specific
performance against the defendant company], we do not find it
necessary, on the basis of the prevailing facts, to rely upon the more
restrictive approach towards the grant of specific performance for land
contracts espoused in the Canadian and the New Zealand cases. As
specific performance is an equitable and discretionary remedy, the
court must, in any event, take into consideration all the circumstances
of the case at hand in order to ensure that it would be just and
equitable to grant the relief.
11.109 So, although the Court of Appeal had observed that the
approach taken by the court below was a departure from "the orthodox
position that specific performance will always be decreed for ... 'land
contracts', ie, contracts relating to immovable property" (E C Investment
at [78]), ultimately, the Court of Appeal concluded that ECI's
application for specific performance ought to be denied simply on the
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basis that on the facts before the court, it would be neither just nor
equitable to grant that relief.
11.110 Five factual points were particularly influential in leading the
Court of Appeal to this conclusion (E CInvestment at [104]-[108]):
First, we note that after ECI exercised the First Option on 27 August
2009, it was quite content to forego its right to acquire the Property if
the compensation offered to it was right. This is shown by the fact that
following the improvement in the property market during that period,
the compensation demanded by ECI escalated from $180,000 (as set
out in the Deed of Settlement) to $3.5m under the September 2009
Settlement, and subsequently, to $5m under the November 2009
Settlement.
Second, in line with its desire for a settlement if the compensation
offered was right, ECI implicitly permitted Ridout [the defendant] to
look for other buyers as ECI knew quite clearly that Ridout/Anwar
had no other means to pay the compensation demanded except by
selling the Property to another person. We agree with the Judge's
observations that: (a) 'it [was] clear [ECI] was happy not to proceed
with completion and was trying to seek some kind of quick
turnaround and large payout' (see [108] of the Judgment); and
(b) '[ECI] by its conduct after 11 August 2009 clearly led [Anwar] to
believe that it agreed, for a higher 'compensation', to allow [Anwar] to
look for another buyer and ... would not proceed to complete the
purchase of the Property' (see [120] of the Judgment).
Third, there should have been a happy ending under the November
2009 Settlement, but it was not to be. It is true that by JLC's letter to
TLP of 11 November 2009, Ridout agreed to pay ECI the sum of $5m
by noon on 16 November 2009, but, as things turned out, Ridout
could not raise that sum in time. Its request for a mere two-day
extension to make payment was rejected. We agree with the Judge's
finding (at [115] of the Judgment) that ECI did not agree to this
extension 'because of the significant rise in property prices and
decided to go for a bigger payout, by claiming the Property itself'.
Fourth, during the hearing of the present appeals, counsel for ECI
brought it to our attention that in the event of our ruling that the
Transaction was indeed for the sale of the Property by Ridout to ECI,
this court should order that the transfer of the Property to Thomas
Chan (which was effected on 17 December 2010 following the
judgment of the court below) be undone. It is trite that an appeal does
not operate as a stay of execution (see s 41 of the Supreme Court of
Judicature Act (Cap 322, 2007 Rev Ed) and 0 57 r 15(1)(a) of the
Rules of Court). Although ECI's failure/omission to apply for a stay of
the transfer of the Property to Thomas Chan does not ipso facto
disentitle it from praying to this court for specific performance of the
Sale Agreement, its failure/omission in this regard is a factor which the
court can take into account in determining fairness and in exercising
its discretion to grant or refuse specific performance.
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Fifth, and more importantly, we note that Orion [Oil Ltd, the first
intervener in the proceedings who claimed an interest in the
proceedings and who] has a charge over the balance of the sale
proceeds of the Property (after the satisfaction of HLF's prior interest)
as security for its loan of $10m to Anwar ... Tremendous hardship
would be suffered by Orion should specific performance of the Sale
Agreement be granted to ECI as the Property would then be sold to
ECI for a mere $20m. There would, in that scenario be very little
money left from the sale proceeds of the Property for Orion after HLF
has taken its share of the sale proceeds as mortgagee. This would be
extremely unfair to Orion. On the other hand, Orion would not suffer
any hardship if the sale of the property to Thomas Chan is allowed to
stand. Land is regarded as physically and commercially unique. It is
not easily replaced with another plot of land or with money per se -
a fact recognised by the courts through (inter alia) the remedy of
specific performance of contracts relating to land (see, eg, Hexter v
Pearce [1900] 1 Ch 341 at 346 and Rudd v Lascelles [1900] 1 Ch 815
at 819).
11.111 The Court of Appeal's reliance on the matters set out in these
five paragraphs is not, however, completely immune to criticism. In
relation to the matters set out in the first paragraph, it may be true that
ECI was willing to give up its right to acquire the property for the right
(and as it turned out, an increasing) price. However, having concluded
that there was no question of ECI having come to the court with
unclean hands, it is not obvious what force ECI's willingness to
compromise its rights if the right price were paid would have in respect
of making an order of specific performance an inappropriate remedy
since one's desire to strike a good bargain is not, in itself, usually taken
to give rise to such inequity as would lead a court to refuse to grant
equitable remedies.
11.112 In relation to the second paragraph, the Court of Appeal makes
reference to ECI having behaved in a manner which led the defendant to
believe it would not proceed to complete the purchase of the property.
However, again, whether this would make it inequitable for the court to
exercise its discretion in favour of ordering specific performance is
doubtful. This is because a careful reading of the findings at first
instance suggests that the first settlement was arguably found to have
been one in which ECI promised to relinquish its rights to complete the
purchase of the property in exchange for payment of the S$3.5m
settlement figure by way of a cashier's order (E C Investment at [85]),
and that payment never transpired. Notwithstanding that this was
probably the most straightforward basis upon which specific
performance might have been refused (on the basis that if the
obligations arising under the option had been discharged by agreement
there would then be nothing left to specifically enforce), if ECI had only
agreed to release its rights under the option in exchange for executed
consideration in the form of actual payment of the settlement sum, that
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release would never have been effective since no such payment was
made. This state of affairs was arguably unaffected by the second
settlement which was, it seems, on the same terms save for the
settlement sum which had been increased to S$5m: E C Investment
at [86]. Far from leading the vendors on, it would seem that what had
been found in the court below was that the legal rights under the option
were only to be given up upon payment* nothing less would do.
11.113 In relation to the third paragraph, it is unclear why ECI's reasons
for refusing to permit the defendant more time to make payment under
the settlement agreements have any relevance in connection with the
exercise of the court's discretion to grant an order of specific
performance. It should be recalled that to begin with, the defendant had
lost its right to cancel the option to purchase the property. That is to say,
the defendant was legally obliged to convey the property to ECI.
Although ECI agreed to release the defendant from that obligation if it
was paid the settlement amount by the stipulated date, that payment did
not occur. Even if this was a case where time would not have been of the
essence, that would only preclude the possibility of discharge of the
contract on account of the delay (ie, discharge by breach). However, that
was not the issue before the court. This was not a case whereby ECI was
seeking to discharge any contract on grounds of breach by reason of
delayed performance. Quite the contrary - this was a case where a
condition precedent to ECI becoming obligated to release the vendor
from its obligations had not been complied with. That being the case,
why should ECI's refusal to permit the defendant more time to pay in
respect of the subsequent settlement agreements have any effect on its
application to enforce its legal rights which had accrued at a prior point
in time?
11.114 As for the fifth and final ground - again, this is problematic.
The inequity to Orion, the second interveners, would seem to stem from
Orion's decision to lend to an entity, the defendant, who was in a
difficult financial situation and from Orion's own commercial decision
to take security on the proceeds of the sale of the property. The
"inequity" of leaving the second interveners in a position where they
would recover little of that which they had lent to the defendant out of
the security they had obtained over the proceeds of sale of the property
is, again, not obvious since that was exactly what they had bargained for.
They took the risk that their security might not realise very much,
dependent as it was on the price which the defendant might realise were
it to sell the property.
11.115 With respect, the only matters which might provide some
support for the court's decision not to grant the order sought appear to
lie roughly within the fourth paragraph set out above. Though that
paragraph does not make the point explicitly, because of the failure to
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apply for a stay pending the outcome of the appeal, by the time the
appeal came to be heard, indefeasible title to the subject property had
been conveyed to Mr Thomas Chan. Whatever equitable interest ECI
might assert in relation to the property, were specific performance
granted, such interest could have no impact on Mr Chan: since his title
to the property had been successfully registered, and all adverse caveats
had been cleared off the register (most notably that which had been filed
by ECI), there could be no issue of competing priorities between
Mr Chan and ECI. Consequently, given that Mr Chan had been granted
indefeasible title to the property by virtue of his successful registration
of the same, there would have been no obvious legal or equitable basis
on which the court might have granted an order of specific performance
to compel him to re-convey that indefeasible legal title to ECI. At best,
this might be possible as between Mr Chan and the defendant - if the
contract for sale between them were rescinded because of some relevant
vitiating factor or was otherwise void. If that had occurred or could
occur, ECI might then seek an order of specific performance against the
defendant to convey title to the property to it, pending re-conveyance of
title to the defendant from Mr Chan. However, there seems not to have
been any relevant factor to vitiate the contract of sale extant between
Mr Chan and the defendant. In short, even if ECI had shown that this
was a possible case where specific performance might have been ordered
against the defendant to convey title to the property in question to it, by
the time of the appeal, the defendant had no such title. Indefeasible title
to the property had passed to Mr Chan. Based on what was reported,
nor did there seem to be any basis on which Mr Chan might be ordered
to re-vest that title in the defendant, much less transfer that title to ECI.
Making an order for specific performance against the defendant to
convey title to property which it no longer held title to would be akin to
compelling it to perform the impossible - and this is plainly one of the
factors which will incline a court against making such an order. This,
however, explains only the outcome in light of ECI's behaviour
following the decision at first instance. It would provide no general
guidance as to when and whether specific performance ought to be
granted in respect of breaches of contracts for the sale of land. Perhaps
that is as well. It may be that E C Investment is best seen as a decision to
be understood solely in respect of its own unique facts and should not
be taken as authority for any more general proposition.
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